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Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument

  • Original paper in Metaphysics of Science
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Abstract

There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this paper, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the interventionist approach to causation, our understanding of physicalism has to change, and this leads to what I call pluralistic physicalism. Secondly, I show that this pluralistic physicalism is not endangered by the causal exclusion argument.

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Acknowledgements

I thank Vera Hoffmann-Kolss, Dan Brooks and Laura Bringmann for very helpful discussions and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank the three anonymous referees of this journal, whose comments helped significantly improve the article. Finally, I am grateful to the Finnish Cultural Foundation for supporting this work financially.

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  1. Institut für Philosophie II; GA03/150, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, 44780, Bochum, Germany

    Markus I. Eronen

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Eronen, M.I. Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 2, 219–232 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0041-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0041-7

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