European Journal for Philosophy of Science

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 89–118 | Cite as

Genuinely collective emotions

Original paper in the Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences

Abstract

It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states.

Keywords

Distributed cognition Emotion 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyGeorgetown UniversityWashingtonUSA

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