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Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy

  • Florian Cova
  • Brent Strickland
  • Angela Abatista
  • Aurélien Allard
  • James Andow
  • Mario Attie
  • James Beebe
  • Renatas Berniūnas
  • Jordane Boudesseul
  • Matteo Colombo
  • Fiery Cushman
  • Rodrigo Diaz
  • Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen
  • Vilius Dranseika
  • Brian Earp
  • Antonio Gaitán Torres
  • Ivar Hannikainen
  • José V. Hernández-Conde
  • Wenjia Hu
  • François Jaquet
  • Kareem Khalifa
  • Hanna Kim
  • Markus Kneer
  • Joshua Knobe
  • Miklos Kurthy
  • Anthony Lantian
  • Shen-yi Liao
  • Edouard Machery
  • Tania Moerenhout
  • Christian Mott
  • Mark Phelan
  • Jonathan Phillips
  • Navin Rambharose
  • Kevin Reuter
  • Felipe Romero
  • Paulo Sousa
  • Jan Sprenger
  • Emile Thalabard
  • Kevin Tobia
  • Hugo Viciana
  • Daniel Wilkenfeld
  • Xiang Zhou
Article

Abstract

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This project could not have been possible without the financial support of multiple organizations. Florian Cova’s work on this project was supported by a grant from the Cogito Foundation (Grant No. S-131/13, “Towards an Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics”).

Brent Strickland’s work was supported by two grants from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (Grants No. ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL*, ANR-10-LABX-0087 IEC).

Matteo Colombo, Noah van Dongen, Felipe Romero and Jan Sprenger’s work was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) through Starting Grant. No. 640638 (“Making Scientific Inferences More Objective”).

Rodrigo Diaz and Kevin Reuter would like to acknowledge funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation, Grant No. 100012_169484.

Antonio Gaitán Torres and Hugo Viciana benefited from funding from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad for the project “La constitución del sujeto en la interacción social” (Grant No. FFI2015-67569-C2-1-P & FFI2015-67569-C2-2-P).

José Hernández-Conde carried out his work as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Pittsburgh’s HPS Department. He was financially supported by a PhD scholarship and mobility grant from the University of the Basque Country, and by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness research project No. FFI2014-52196-P. His replication research was supported by the Pittsburgh Empirical Philosophy Lab.

Hanna Kim’s work was supported by the Pittsburgh Empirical Philosophy Lab.

Shen-yi Liao’s work was supported by the University of Puget Sound Start-up Funding.

Tania Moerenhout carried out her work as a Visiting Researcher at the Center for Bioethics and Health Law, University of Pittsburgh, PA (Aug 2016-July 2017).

Aurélien Allard, Miklos Kurthy, and Paulo Sousa are grateful to Rashmi Sharma for her help in the replication of Knobe & Burra (2006), in particular for her help in translating the demographic questions from English to Hindi.

Ivar Hannikainen and Florian Cova would like to thank Uri Simonsohn for his help in discussing the meaning and best interpretation of p-curves.

Finally, we would like to thank all the authors of original studies who accepted to take the time to answer our questions, share their original material and data, and discuss the results of our replication attempts with us.

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Authors and Affiliations

  • Florian Cova
    • 1
    • 2
  • Brent Strickland
    • 3
    • 4
  • Angela Abatista
    • 5
  • Aurélien Allard
    • 6
  • James Andow
    • 7
  • Mario Attie
    • 8
  • James Beebe
    • 9
  • Renatas Berniūnas
    • 10
  • Jordane Boudesseul
    • 11
  • Matteo Colombo
    • 12
  • Fiery Cushman
    • 13
  • Rodrigo Diaz
    • 14
  • Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen
    • 15
  • Vilius Dranseika
    • 16
  • Brian Earp
    • 17
  • Antonio Gaitán Torres
    • 18
  • Ivar Hannikainen
    • 19
  • José V. Hernández-Conde
    • 20
  • Wenjia Hu
    • 21
  • François Jaquet
    • 1
  • Kareem Khalifa
    • 22
  • Hanna Kim
    • 23
  • Markus Kneer
    • 24
  • Joshua Knobe
    • 25
  • Miklos Kurthy
    • 26
  • Anthony Lantian
    • 27
  • Shen-yi Liao
    • 28
  • Edouard Machery
    • 29
  • Tania Moerenhout
    • 30
  • Christian Mott
    • 25
  • Mark Phelan
    • 21
  • Jonathan Phillips
    • 13
  • Navin Rambharose
    • 21
  • Kevin Reuter
    • 31
  • Felipe Romero
    • 15
  • Paulo Sousa
    • 32
  • Jan Sprenger
    • 33
  • Emile Thalabard
    • 34
  • Kevin Tobia
    • 25
  • Hugo Viciana
    • 35
  • Daniel Wilkenfeld
    • 29
  • Xiang Zhou
    • 36
  1. 1.Centre Interfacultaire en Sciences AffectivesUniversité de GenèveGenevaSwitzerland
  2. 2.Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, Campus BiotechCISA – University of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland
  3. 3.Département d’Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale SupérieureParisFrance
  4. 4.Institut Jean Nicod, CNRSParisFrance
  5. 5.Faculté de Psychologie et des Sciences de l’EducationUniversité de GenèveGenevaSwitzerland
  6. 6.Laboratoire des Théories du PolitiqueUniversité Paris 8 VincennesSaint-DenisFrance
  7. 7.University of ReadingReadingUK
  8. 8.Department of PhilosophyYale UniversityNew HavenUSA
  9. 9.University at BuffaloBuffaloUSA
  10. 10.Department of General PsychologyVilnius UniversityVilniusLithuania
  11. 11.Instituto de Investigación CientíficaUniversidad de LimaLimaPeru
  12. 12.Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics and Philosophy of ScienceTilburg UniversityTilburgNetherlands
  13. 13.Department of PsychologyHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA
  14. 14.University of BernBernSwitzerland
  15. 15.Tilburg UniversityTilburgNetherlands
  16. 16.Department of Logic and History of Philosophy, Faculty of PhilosophyVilnius UniversityVilniusLithuania
  17. 17.Departments of Philosophy and PsychologyYale UniversityNew HavenUSA
  18. 18.Departamento de HumanidadesUniversidad Carlos III de MadridGetafeSpain
  19. 19.Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de JaneiroRio de JaneiroBrazil
  20. 20.Department of Linguistics and Basque StudiesUniversity of the Basque CountryLeioaSpain
  21. 21.Lawrence UniversityAppletonUSA
  22. 22.Philosophy DepartmentMiddlebury CollegeMiddleburyUSA
  23. 23.Washington and Jefferson CollegeWashingtonUSA
  24. 24.University of ZurichZurichSwitzerland
  25. 25.Yale UniversityNew HavenUSA
  26. 26.University of SheffieldSheffieldUK
  27. 27.Laboratoire Parisien de Psychologie Sociale, UPLUniversité Paris NanterreNanterreFrance
  28. 28.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Puget SoundTacomaUSA
  29. 29.Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Center for Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA
  30. 30.Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences and Department of Family Medicine and Primary Health CareUniversity of GhentGhentBelgium
  31. 31.Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of BernBernSwitzerland
  32. 32.Queen’s University BelfastBelfastUK
  33. 33.Center for Logic, Language and Cognition, Department of Philosophy and Educational SciencesUniversity of TurinTurinItaly
  34. 34.Sciences, Normes, Décision (FRE 3593)Université Paris-SorbonneParisFrance
  35. 35.Juan de la Cierva Research FellowInstituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (IESA-CSIC)CórdobaSpain
  36. 36.University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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