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The Way Things Look: a Defence of Content

  • Andrea Giananti
Article

Abstract

How does perceptual experience disclose the world to our view? In the first introductory section, I set up a contrast between the representational and the purely relational conception of perceptual experience. In the second section, I discuss an argument given by Charles Travis (Mind 113: 57–94, 2004) against perceptual content. The third section is devoted to the phenomenon of perceptual constancy: in 3.1 I describe the phenomenon. In 3.2 I argue that the description given suggests a phenomenological distinction that can be deployed for a defence of content. In 3.3 I compare and contrast my view of perceptual content with that of Susanna Schellenberg (The Journal of Philosophy 105(02): 55–84, 2008). Finally (3.4), I support my conception of content by means of an argument that links content to the way in which the mind-independent nature of material objects is manifest in perceptual experience.

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FribourgFribourgSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of Warwick (Visiting Research Fellow)CoventryUK

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