Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 8, Issue 4, pp 721–741 | Cite as

Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color

  • Peter Brössel


The present paper investigates the first step of rational belief acquisition. It, thus, focuses on justificatory relations between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs, and between their contents, respectively. In particular, the paper aims at outlining how it is possible to reason from the content of perceptual experiences to the content of perceptual beliefs. The paper thereby approaches this aim by combining a formal epistemology perspective with an eye towards recent advances in philosophy of cognition. Furthermore the paper restricts its focus, it concentrates on the case of color perception and perceptual beliefs about color.



I am very grateful to two exceedingly helpful referees of this journal. In addition, I would like to thank Igor Douven, Anna-Maria Asunta Eder and Nina Poth for their invaluable feedback on various versions of this paper and Ben Young for proofreading the manuscript. Research on this paper has been generously supported by an Emmy Noether Grant from the German Research Council (DFG), reference number BR 5210/1-1.

Forthcoming in Review of Philosophy and Psychology


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy IIRuhr-University of BochumBochumGermany

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