Representationalism and Blindsight

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s13164-016-0324-1

Cite this article as:
Peebles, G. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2016). doi:10.1007/s13164-016-0324-1
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Abstract

According to representationalism, phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. According to first-person reports, blindsighters have no phenomenal character in the scotoma, even though their abilities suggest that they have conscious visual representations in the scotoma. The traditional representationalist response is that the representations in the scotoma are either non-conscious or non-visual. Drawing on empirical work, I consider the interpretation that blindsighters are unable to represent—and thus lack the phenomenal character of—luminance in the scotoma. However, they maintain the capacity to represent other visible properties in the scotoma, and thus retain the luminance-lacking phenomenal character of these properties.

Funding information

Funder NameGrant NumberFunding Note
Swiss National Science Foundation
  • CRSI11_127488

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Thumos Research Group, Département de PhilosophieUniversité de GenèveGenève 4Suisse

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