Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 851–862 | Cite as

Endurance, Dualism, Temporal Passage, and Intuitions

  • Jiri Benovsky


Endurantism, as opposed to perdurantism, is supposed to be the intuitive view. But the ‘endurantist intuition’ – roughly, that objects persist through time by being numerically identical and wholly located at all times at which they exist – is behind more than just endurantism. Indeed, it plays an important role in the motivation of some theories about the passage of time (namely, a family of A-theories), and some theories about the nature of the subject (namely, some forms of dualism, and some conceptions of the Self). As we shall see, the endurantist intuition is often taken in these cases to be a reason, or at least a motivation, to endorse one or the other of these metaphysical theories. Sometimes, it is even said to constitute a basis for an argument in their favour. In this article, I show that such an appeal to this ‘endurantist intuition’ is misleading and wrong. I do not deny that there is an intuition of this kind, but I deny that it can play any philosophically significant role as a reason – and even less as a basis for an argument – in defending metaphysical theories such as endurantism, dualism, or the A-theory.


Perceptual System Baseball Player Phenomenal Experience Multiple Object Tracking Baseball Game 
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