Abstract
This paper discusses the validity of nudges to tackle time-inconsistent behaviours. I show that libertarian paternalism is grounded on a peculiar model of personal identity, and that the argument according to which nudges may improve one’s self-assessed well-being can be seriously questioned. I show that time inconsistencies do not necessarily reveal that the decision maker is irrational: they can also be the result of discounting over the degree of psychological connectedness between our successive selves rather than over time (Parfit 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press). Time inconsistency can call for paternalism if and only if we accept that an individual is characterised by stable “true” preferences over time-dependent outcomes, and that she is rationally required to make time-consistent choices. This model is descriptively and normatively questionable. I then argue that behavioural findings may still justify paternalistic interventions, but on a non-welfarist basis.
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Notes
We can notice that a few individuals may suffer from the nudge (those who truly prefer to consume a lot today): the legitimacy of nudges may therefore be questioned in this situation, since nothing justifies a priori that such exceptional individuals can be sacrificed to the benefit of the greatest number. See Bovens (2009, p.211) on this point.
Throughout the rest of the paper, I will simply say “t-Oscar preferences” instead of “t-Oscar preferences over time-dependent outcomes”.
I will discuss in section 4 the possibility to justify paternalistic interventions if condition (1) is not verified, since the choice of t-Oscar can be seen as a choice involving several individuals (with different true preferences). This will however not be a case of means paternalism, and will not support the paternalistic claim of LP.
A solution would be to consider t 0 -Oscar’s probability of dying before t n : since there is a probability that t n -Oscar does not exist, t 0 -Oscar would then be able to discount the utility of his future selves. This argument cannot however ensure that the difference (d 0,n+1 – d 0,n ) remains constant over time: this would indeed require that Oscar has the same probability of dying at each period, which is highly implausible.
Frederick (2003) stresses the difficulty of defining an objective measure of psychological connectedness. He for instance measures β by asking to subjects in an experiment to “rate how similar you expect to be in the future compared to how you are now, and how similar you were in the past compared to how you are now. By similar, I mean characteristics such as personality, temperament, likes and dislikes, beliefs, values, ambitions, goals, ideals, etc.” on a scale from 0 (completely different) to 100 (exactly the same).
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions that substantially improved this paper. I also thank Robert Sugden for his careful rereading of the paper.
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I, Guilhem Lecouteux, declare that I have no conflict of interest.
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I, Guilhem Lecouteux, declare that this manuscript is original, has not been published before and is not currently being considered for publication elsewhere. I can confirm that the manuscript has been read and approved by all named authors and that there are no other persons who satisfied the criteria for authorship but are not listed.
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Lecouteux, G. In Search of Lost Nudges. Rev.Phil.Psych. 6, 397–408 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0265-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0265-0