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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 455–468 | Cite as

Nudging as a Threat to Privacy

  • Andreas Kapsner
  • Barbara Sandfuchs
Article

Abstract

Nudges can pose serious threats to citizens’ privacy. The essay discusses several examples of nudges that must appear problematic to anyone valuing privacy. The paper also re-draws a well established connection between privacy and autonomy and argues that insofar as nudges incur too great a loss of privacy, they are incompatible with the libertarianism that libertarian paternalism is committed to by virtue of its very name.

Keywords

Personal Data Privacy Protection Privacy Concern Default Rule Privacy Cost 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

The research of the first author was funded by the German Research Foundation (Project PI 1082/1-1 0228 885 2134).

We would like to thank Simon Garnett, Prof. Gerrit Hornung, three anonymous referees and the editors for helpful comments on this paper.

Compliance with ethical standards

The work complies with all ethical standards as listed on the ROPP webpage.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Munich Center for Mathematical PhilosophyLMU MunichMunichGermany
  2. 2.GRF Research Training Group “Privacy”University of PassauPassauGermany

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