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Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse?

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The Original Article was published on 07 May 2015

Abstract

I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.

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Funding

Research for this paper was funded by the Spanish MCINN, under grants FFI2011-26853 andCSD2009- 0056, and by AGAUR, under grant 2014-SGR-81.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. ICREA, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

    Josefa Toribio

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  1. Josefa Toribio
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Correspondence to Josefa Toribio.

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Toribio, J. Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse?. Rev.Phil.Psych. 6, 611–615 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0257-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0257-0

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