Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 427–437 | Cite as

The Institutional Consequences of Nudging – Nudges, Politics, and the Law

Article

Abstract

In this article we argue that a widespread adoption of nudging can alter legal and political institutions. Debates on nudges thus far have largely revolved around a set of philosophical theories that we call individualistic approaches. Our analysis concerns the ways in which adherents of nudging make use of the newest findings in the behavioral sciences for the purposes of policy-making. We emphasize the fact that most nudges proposed so far are not a part of the legal system and are also non-normative. We propose two ideal types: “law-as-normative” and “law-as-instrumental”, that allow us to understand and evaluate the relation of nudges and the law. We stress the importance of law as a safeguard for the possible negative consequences of nudges and conclude with proposals that could complement nudging policies.

References

  1. Alemanno, A., and A. Spina. 2014. Nudging legally: On the checks and balances of behavioral regulation. International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(2): 429–456.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bovens, L. 2008. The ethics of nudge. In Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology, ed. T. Grüne-Yanoff and S.O. Hansson, 207–219. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
  3. Conly, S. 2013. Against autonomy: justifying coercive paternalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Freeman, S. 2007. Rawls. Routledge.Google Scholar
  5. Gigerenzer, G. 2000. Adaptive thinking: Rationality in the real world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Gigerenzer, G., and P. Todd. 1999. Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Glaeser, E.L. 2006. Paternalism and psychology. University of Chicago Law Review 73(1): 133–156.Google Scholar
  8. Grüne-Yanoff, T. 2012. Old wine in new casks: Libertarian paternalism still violates liberal principles. Social Choice and Welfare 38(4): 635–645.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Habermas, J. 1996. Between facts and norms. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  10. Hansen, P.G., and A.M. Jespersen. 2013. Nudge and a manipulation of choice. European Journal of Risk Regulation 1: 3–28.Google Scholar
  11. Harel, A. 2014. Why law matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Hausman, D.M., and B. Welch. 2010. Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge. Journal of Political Philosophy 18(1): 123–136.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Jolls, Ch., and C.R. Sunstein. 2006. Debiasing through law. Journal of Legal Studies 35: 199–241.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Kahneman, D. 2012. Thinking, fast and slow. UK: Penguin.Google Scholar
  15. Mitchel, G. 2005. Libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron. Northwestern University Law Review 99(3): 1245.Google Scholar
  16. Pound, R. 1942. Social control through law. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice (Revised Ed.). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Saghai, Y. 2013. Salvaging the concept of nudge. Journal of Medical Ethics 39(8): 487–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Sunstein, C.R. 2000. Introduction. In Behavioral law & economics, ed. C.R. Sunstein, 1–10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Sunstein, C.R. 2013. Simpler: the future of government. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar
  21. Sunstein, C.R. 2014a. Why nudge?: The politics of libertarian paternalism (the Storrs Lectures series). The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism.Google Scholar
  22. Sunstein, C.R. 2014b. Nudging. A very short guide. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2499658.
  23. Sunstein, C.R. 2014c. Choosing not to choose. Duke Law Journal 64: 1–52.Google Scholar
  24. Sunstein, C.R., and R. Thaler. 2003a. Libertarian paternalism. The American Economics Review 93(2): 175–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Sunstein, C.R., and R. Thaler. 2003b. Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. University of Chicago Law Review 70(4): 1159–1202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Tamanaha, B.Z. 2006. Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law. Leiden: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Teubner, G. 1986. After legal instrumentalism. In Dilemmas of law in the welfare state, ed. G. Teubner. Berlin: De Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Thaler, R.H., and Sunstein, C.R. 2001. Libertarian Paternalism. Behavioral Economics, Public Policy, And Paternalism, 175–179.Google Scholar
  29. Thaler, R.H., and C.R. Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  30. Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, New Series 185(4157): 1124–1131.Google Scholar
  31. Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1991. Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4): 1039–1061.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Veetil, V.P. 2011. Libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron: An essay in defence of liberty. European Journal of Law and Economics 31(3): 321–334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Waldron, J. 2014. It’s All for Your Own Good. The New York Review of Books. Retrieved October 15, 2014, from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/cass-sunstein-its-all-your-own-good/.
  34. Weber, M. (1949). The methodology of the social sciences. Shils E.A. & Finch, H.A. (transl.). Glencoe, IL.: The Free Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.European University InstituteFiesoleItaly
  2. 2.Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences & European University InstituteFiesoleItaly

Personalised recommendations