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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 495–509 | Cite as

The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture

  • Chris Mills
Article

Abstract

Choice architecture is heralded as a policy approach that does not coercively reduce freedom of choice. Still we might worry that this approach fails to respect individual choice because it subversively manipulates individuals, thus contravening their personal autonomy. In this article I address two arguments to this effect. First, I deny that choice architecture is necessarily heteronomous. I explain the reasons we have for avoiding heteronomous policy-making and offer a set of four conditions for non-heteronomy. I then provide examples of nudges that meet these conditions. I argue that these policies are capable of respecting and promoting personal autonomy, and show this claim to be true across contrasting conceptions of autonomy. Second, I deny that choice architecture is disrespectful because it is epistemically paternalistic. This critique appears to loom large even against non-heteronomous nudges. However, I argue that while some of these policies may exhibit epistemically paternalistic tendencies, these tendencies do not necessarily undermine personal autonomy. Thus, if we are to find such policies objectionable, we cannot do so on the grounds of respect for autonomy.

Keywords

Choice Architect Personal Autonomy Public Reason Default Rule Autonomous Choice 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Ethical Statement

This article required no research involving participants and did not receive funding from any non-academic body.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that they have no conflict of interest.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Ethics and LawUCL Faculty of LawsLondonUK

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