Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control
This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends on the sense of agency. In this regard, the sense of agency still appears to be the originating problem.
- Bermúdez, J.L. 2011. Bodily awareness and self-consciousness. In The Oxford handbook of the self, ed. S. Gallagher, 157–179. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Billon, A., and U. Kriegel. 2014. Jaspers’ dilemma: The psychopathological challenge to subjectivity theories of consciousness. In Disturbed consciousness, ed. R. Gennaro. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Bleuler, E. 1950. Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias. Oxford: International Universities Press.Google Scholar
- Bortolotti, L. 2010. Delusions and other irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Bratman, M.E. 1987. Intention, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- Friston, K.J., and C.D. Frith. 1995. Schizophrenia: a disconnection syndrome? Clinical Neuroscience 3: 89–97.Google Scholar
- Frith, C.D. 1992. The cognitive neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Google Scholar
- Gallagher, S. (2007). Sense of agency and higher-order cognition: levels of explanation for schizophrenia. Cognitive Semiotics, 0, 32–48.Google Scholar
- Gallagher, S. 2011. In Time in action. Oxford handbook on time, ed. C. Callender, 419–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Gallagher, S., and A. Marcel. 1999. The self in contextualized action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(4): 4–30.Google Scholar
- Gallagher, S., and F. Varela. 2003. Redrawing the map and resetting the time: phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29: 93–132.Google Scholar
- Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. (2010). Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.
- Gold, I., and J. Hohwy. 2000. Rationality and schizophrenic delusion. In Pathologies of belief, ed. M. Coltheart and M. Davies, 145–165. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
- Graham, G., and G.L. Stephens. 1994. Mind and mine. In Philosophical psychopathology, ed. G. Graham and G.L. Stephens, 91–109. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Kalckert, A., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2012). Moving a rubber hand that feels like your own: a dissociation of ownership and agency. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6.Google Scholar
- Lane, T. 2014. Self, belonging, and conscious experience: A critique of subjectivity theories of consciousness. In Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness, ed. R. Gennaro. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Marcel, A. 2003. The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action. In Agency and awareness, ed. J. Roessler and N. Eilan, 48–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Pacherie, E. (2007). The sense of control and the sense of agency. Psyche, 13(1). http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/.
- Roessler, J. 2013. Thought insertion, self-awareness, and rationality. In The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry, ed. K.W.M. Fulford et al., 658–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Spencer, K.M., P.G. Nestor, M.A. Niznikiewicz, et al. 2003. Abnormal neural synchrony in schizophrenia. The Journal of Neuroscience 23(19): 7407–7411.Google Scholar
- Stephan, K. E., Friston, K. J., & Frith, C. D. (2009). Dysconnection in schizophrenia: from abnormal synaptic plasticity to failures of self-monitoring. Schizophrenia Bulletin, sbn176.Google Scholar
- Stephens, G.L., and G. Graham. 2000. When self-consciousness breaks: Alien voices and inserted thoughts. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar