Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 6, Issue 4, pp 865–879 | Cite as

Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control



This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends on the sense of agency. In this regard, the sense of agency still appears to be the originating problem.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MemphisMemphisUSA
  2. 2.School of HumanitiesUniversity of HertfordshireHertfordshireUK
  3. 3.Faculty of Law, Humanities and the ArtsUniversity of WollongongWollongongAustralia

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