Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2001. The bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology 14: 43–64.
Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2008. The bounds of cognition. Malden: Blackwell.
Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2010. Why the mind is still in the head. In Extended cognition, ed. R. Menary, 67–80. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Aizawa, K. 2010. The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited. Cognitive Systems Research 11: 332–342.
Alsmith, A., and F. de Vignemont. 2012. Embodying the mind and representing the body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3: 1–13.
Anderson, M. 2007. Massive redeployment, exaptation, and the functional integration of cognitive operations. Synthese 159: 329–345.
Ballard, D., M. Hayhoe, P. Pook, and R. Rao. 1997. Deictic codes for the embodiment of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20: 723–767.
Barker, M. 2010. From cognition’s location to the epistemology of its nature. Cognitive Systems Research 11: 357–366.
Barnier, A., J. Sutton, C. Harris, and R. Wilson. 2008. A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition. Cognitive Systems Research 9: 33–51.
Barrett, L. 2011. Beyond the brain. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Borghi, A., C. Scorolli, D. Caligiore, G. Baldassarre, and L. Tummolini. 2013. The embodied mind extended. Frontiers in Psychology 4(214): 1–10.
Brooks, R. 1991. Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence 47: 139–159.
Chandrasekharan, S., and N. Nersessian. 2011. Building cognition: the construction of external representations for discovery. Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society 33: 267–272.
Chatterjee, A. 2010. Disembodying cognition. Language and Cognition 2: 79–116.
Chemero, A. 2009. Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Clark, A. 2008a. Pressing the flesh: a tension in the study of the embodied, embedded mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 37–59.
Clark, A. 2008b. Supersizing the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A., and D. Chalmers. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58: 7–19.
Colombetti, G. 2013. The feeling body: affective science meets the enactive mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Cowley, S., and F. Vallée-Tourangeau. 2013. Cognition beyond the brain. London: Springer.
Craver, C. 2007. Explaining the brain. Oxford: Clarendon.
Davis, J., A. Benforado, E. Esrock, A. Turner, R. Dalton, L. van Noorden, and M. Leman. 2012. Four applications of embodied cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science 4: 786–793.
Dehaene, S. 2009. Reading in the brain. New York: Penguin.
De Jaegher, H., and E. Di Paolo. 2007. Participatory sense-making: an enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6: 485–507.
De Jaegher, H., E. Di Paolo, and S. Gallagher. 2010. Can social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14: 441–447.
Dempsey, L., and I. Shani. 2012. Stressing the flesh: in defense of strong embodiment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86: 590–617.
Dennett, D. 2000. Making tools for thinking. In Metarepresentations, ed. D. Sperber, 17–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Di Paolo, E. 2009. Extended life. Topoi 28: 9–21.
Di Paolo, E., M. Rohde, and H. De Jaegher. 2010. Horizons for the enactive mind. In Enaction, ed. J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. Di Paolo, 33–88. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dodig-Crnkovic, G., and R. Giovagnoli. 2013. Computing nature. Berlin: Springer.
Fodor, J. 1975. The language of thought. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. 1983. The modularity of mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gallese, V. 2008. Mirror neurons and the social nature of language. Social Neuroscience 3: 317–333.
Gibson, J. 1979. The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Goldin-Meadow, S. 1999. The role of gesture in communication and thinking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3: 9–429.
Goldin-Meadow, S., and S. Wagner. 2005. How our hands help us learn. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9: 234–241.
Goldman, A. 2013. A moderate approach to embodied cognitive science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3: 71–88.
Goldman, A., and F. de Vignemont. 2009. Is social cognition embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13: 154–159.
Haugeland, J. 1995. Mind embodied and embedded. Acta Philosophica Fennica 58: 233–267.
Heath, J., and J. Anderson. 2010. Procrastination and the extended will. In The thief of time, ed. C. Andreou and M. White, 233–252. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hurley, S. 2001. Perception and action: alternative views. Synthese 129: 3–40.
Hurley, S. 2008. The shared circuits model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31: 1–58.
Hutchins, E. 1995. Cognition in the wild. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hutchins, E. 2014. Human cognition: culturally pervasive, not extended. Philosophical Psychology. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.830548.
Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2013. Radicalizing enactivism. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Kirsh, D., and P. Maglio. 1994. On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive Science 18: 513–549.
Kiverstein, J., and A. Clark. 2009. Introduction: mind embodied, embedded, enacted. Topoi 28: 1–7.
Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the flesh. New York: Basic Books.
Logan, R. 2007. The extended mind: the emergence of language, the human mind, and culture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Lutz, A., and E. Thompson. 2003. Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(9–10): 31–52.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/2012). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge.
Meteyard, L., S. Cuadrado, B. Bahrami, and G. Vigliocco. 2012. Coming of age: a review of embodiment and the neuroscience of semantics. Cortex 48: 788–807.
Milkowski, M. 2013. Explaining the computational mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Müller-Schloer, C., H. Schmeck, and T. Ungerer. 2011. Organic computing. Basel: Birkhäuser.
Noë, A. 2004. Action in perception. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pfeifer, R., and J. Bongard. 2007. How the body shapes the way we think. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Piccinini, G. 2008. Computation without representation. Philosophical Studies 137: 205–241.
Piccinini, G. 2012. Computationalism. In The Oxford handbook of philosophy of cognitive science, ed. R. Samuels, E. Margolis, and S. Stich, 222–249. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prinz, J. 2009. Is consciousness embodied? In The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition, ed. P. Robbins and M. Aydede, 419–437. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Robbins, P., and M. Aydede. 2009. The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rohde, M. 2010. Enaction, embodiment, evolutionary robotics. Amsterdam: Atlantis Press.
Rowlands, M. 2009a. Enactivism and the extended mind. Topoi 28: 53–62.
Rowlands, M. 2009b. Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology 22: 1–19.
Rowlands, M. 2010. The new science of the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rupert, R. 2004. Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101: 389–428.
Rupert, R. 2009. Cognitive systems and the extended mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scherer, K. 2005. What are emotions? and how can they be measured? Social Science Information 44: 695–729.
Schulz, A. 2013. Overextension: the extended mind and arguments from evolutionary biology. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3: 241–255.
Shapiro, L. 2004. The mind incarnate. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Shapiro, L. 2010. James Bond and the barking dog: evolution and extended cognition. Philosophy of Science 77: 400–418.
Shapiro, L. 2011. Embodied cognition. London: Routledge.
Shapiro, L. 2012. Embodied cognition. In The Oxford handbook of philosophy of cognitive science, ed. R. Samuels, E. Margolis, and S. Stich, 118–146. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, L. 2013. When is cognition embodied? In U. Kriegel (Ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind (pp. 73–90). London: Routledge.
Sprevak, M. 2010. Inference to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41: 353–362.
Stapleton, M. 2013. Steps to a “Properly Embodied” cognitive science. Cognitive Systems Research 22–23: 1–11.
Sterelny, K. 2010. Minds: extended or scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9: 465–481.
Stewart, J., O. Gapenne, and E. Di Paolo. 2010. Enaction. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Thelen, E., G. Schöner, C. Scheier, and L. Smith. 2001. The dynamics of embodiment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 1–86.
Thelen, E., and L. Smith. 1994. A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Thompson, E., and M. Stapleton. 2009. Making sense of sense-making. Topoi 28: 23–30.
Thompson, E., and F. Varela. 2001. Radical embodiment. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5: 418–425.
Torrance, S. 2005. In search of the enactive. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4: 357–368.
van Gelder, T. 1995. What might cognition be, if not computation? Journal of Philosophy 91: 345–381.
van Gelder, T. 1998. The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21: 615–628.
Varela, F., E. Thompson, and E. Rosch. 1991. The embodied mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Walter, S. 2010. Locked-in syndrome, BCI, and a confusion about embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted cognition. Neuroethics 3: 61–72.
Walter, S., and L. Kästner. 2012. The where and what of cognition: The untenability of cognitive agnosticism and the motley crew argument. Cognitive Systems Research 13: 12–23.
Ward, D., and M. Stapleton. 2012. Es are good: Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended. In Consciousness in interaction, ed. F. Paglieri and C. Castelfranchi, 89–104. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Wehner, R., and M. Müller. 2006. The significance of direct sunlight and polarized skylight in the ant’s celestial system of navigation. Proccedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 103: 12575–12579.
Weiskopf, D. 2008. Patrolling the mind’s boundaries. Erkenntnis 68: 265–276.
Wheeler, M. 2005. Reconstructing the cognitive world. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wheeler, M. 2010. Minds, things, and materiality. In The cognitive life of things, ed. L. Malafouris and C. Renfrew, 29–38. Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs.
Wheeler, M. 2011. Embodied cognition and the extended mind. In The continuum companion to the philosophy of mind, ed. J. Garvey, 220–238. London: Continuum.
Wilson, A., and S. Golonka. 2013. Embodied cognition is not what you think it is. Frontiers in Cognitive Science 4(58): 1–13.
Wilson, M. 2002. Six views on embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9: 625–636.
Wilson, R. 1994. Wide computationalism. Mind 103: 351–372.
Wilson, R. 2004. Boundaries of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, R. 2005. Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis. Cognitive Processing 6: 227–236.
Wilson, R., and A. Clark. 2009. How to situate cognition. In The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition, ed. P. Robbins and M. Aydede, 55–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, R., & Foglia, L. (2011). Embodied cognition. In: E. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.
Woodward, J. 2003. Making things happen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.