Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp 543–557 | Cite as

Pluralism on Artefact Categories: A Philosophical Defence

Article

Abstract

In this paper we use our work in the philosophy of technology to formulate a pluralist view on artefact categories and categorisation principles, as studied in cognitive science. We argue, on the basis of classifications derived by philosophical reconstruction, that artefacts can be clustered in more than one way, and that each clustering may be taken as defining psychological artefact categories. We contrast this pluralism with essentialism and super-minimalism on artefact categories and we argue that pluralism is coherent with experimental results regarding the context-dependence of artefact categorisation.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Research by Wybo Houkes was made possible by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy and EthicsEindhoven University of TechnologyEindhovenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyDelft University of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands

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