Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 309–331 | Cite as

What’s the Problem with the Frame Problem?

Article

Abstract

The frame problem was originally a problem for Artificial Intelligence, but philosophers have interpreted it as an epistemological problem for human cognition. As a result of this reinterpretation, however, specifying the frame problem has become a difficult task. To get a better idea of what the frame problem is, how it gives rise to more general problems of relevance, and how deep these problems run, I expound six guises of the frame problem. I then assess some proposed heuristic solutions to the frame problem; I show that these proposals misunderstand, and fail to address, an important aspect of the frame problem. Finally, I argue that though human cognition does not solve the frame problem in its epistemological guise, human cognition avoids some of the epistemological worries.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Chris Viger for all his comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Richard Samuels and Rob Stainton for comments and input on earlier drafts. And thanks to an anonymous referee of this journal whose comments helped to improve the latter part of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Stevenson HallThe University of Western OntarioLondonCanada

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