Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 3, Issue 4, pp 481–514 | Cite as

(Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust

  • Kourken MichaelianEmail author


What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.


Source Monitoring Folk Psychology Mental Time Travel Deception Detection Testimonial Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



Thanks for comments and discussion to Joëlle Proust, Sam Wilkinson, two anonymous referees, and audiences at the Third Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology (Social Epistemology Research Group, Københavns Universitet), a meeting of the Filosofiska Föreningen at Lunds Universitet (organized by Frank Zenker), and the “Brains, Minds, and Language” workshop at Bogaziçi Üniversitesi (organized by Lucas Thorpe and Ali Salah).


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Felsefe BölümüBilkent ÜniversitesiAnkaraTurkey

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