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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp 483–498 | Cite as

Folk Epistemology as Normative Social Cognition

  • Benoit Hardy-Vallée
  • Benoît DubreuilEmail author
Article

Abstract

Research on folk epistemology usually takes place within one of two different paradigms. The first is centered on epistemic theories or, in other words, the way people think about knowledge. The second is centered on epistemic intuitions, that is, the way people intuitively distinguish knowledge from belief. In this paper, we argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the connection between the two paradigms, as well as to the mechanisms that underlie the use of both epistemic intuitions and theories. We contend that research on folk epistemology must examine the use of both intuitions and theories in the pragmatic context of the game of giving and asking for reasons and, more generally, understand how these practices take place within the broader context of normative social cognition.

Keywords

True Belief Intentional Action Causal Chain Folk Psychology Gettier Case 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

BHV’s work was supported by a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and BD’s work by the Fonds québécois de recherche sur la société et la culture (FQRSC). We thank Joseph Heath for having us realize the importance of understanding epistemology within the context of pragmatics and normativity, as well as Christophe Heintz, Chad Horne, and an anonymous reviewer for comments on a previous version of the article.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Decision Support ServicesSBR GlobalTorontoCanada
  2. 2.Department of philosophyUniversité du Québec à MontréalMontréalCanada

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