Abstract
This paper examines the possibility that market failures may be explained by predatory information flows between sellers and buyers when they act in dysfunctional relationships characterized by predator–prey dynamics and a behavioral pattern we define as “financial spinning.” The Global Financial Crisis serves as an example, among many others. It involved predatory mortgages and heavy securitization, and illustrates the fact that some sellers of toxic products (individuals and corporations) may have strong incentives to get buyers-prey to become disconnected from their financial needs, goals, and preferences, while accumulating debt. This may happen even in the context of a knowledge economy, and may lead the market towards failure. Computer-driven trajectory exploration based on learning-factored Lotka-Volterra equations shows that the predatory, noxious information is beneficial to sellers-predators but only up to a point. Consumers, for their part, are not always willing or able to receive sufficient information, which would otherwise allow them to protect themselves. Our approach may also guide corporations’ efforts towards improving their customer relationships, social image, and community participation. We contribute to the use of Lotka-Volterra equations and trajectory exploration in the context of predatory asymmetry of information at the interpersonal, sellers-buyers level, of spinning and of market failure.
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Notes
Appendix 1 provides the main economic models attempting to explain/understand market failure by various scholars with their shortfalls.
Indeed, the expression “burden” is mostly used in a legal context, such as “burden of proof,” or in an accounting framework. We use the term burden to assign the weight of responsibility that some consumers bear when acting as consumers. This is exemplified, for example, in the context of bio-responsible purchasing or when dealing with the burden of taxes (Cunningham, 2002).
CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing Model, used extensively to approximate the expected rate of return of an asset (Levy, 2010).
The absence of substitutes and of geographical expansion renders the debt trap consumers-prey fall in that much more lethal.
This applies to all predators (active and inactive) and all prey (real and potential).
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Main economic models attempting to explain/understand market failures
Model | Scholarly authors | Year | Shortfall |
---|---|---|---|
SRISK | Engle & Ruan | The behavioral aspects of market agents largely ignored | |
Global financial cycle | Habib & Venditti, European Central Bank | Discuss risk aversion, but not speculation | |
Predatory dynamics | Huck et al | No discussion on spinning | |
Animal Spirits | Akerlof & Shiller | Do not anchor opportunistic behaviors in a larger frame that includes business cycles | |
Macroeconomic model | Brunnermeier & Sannikov | Discuss volatility, but not moral hazards generated by market agents | |
Financial accelerator and the role of the Federal Reserve | Bernanke | Does not explain the mathematical link between consumers and suppliers’ behaviors | |
Liquidity spiral | Brunnermeier & Oehmke | Do not address in-depth how toxic products infect markets | |
Bubbles and crashes | Abreu & Brunnermeier | Address rationality but not moral hazard | |
Opportunism and contract theory | Williamson | Opposes trust to opportunistic behaviors in contractual agreements without reference to business cycles | |
Credit cycles | Kiyotaki & Moore | Do not link impatience to speculation |
Appendix 2. List of parameters used in the spinning model
Trajectory | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Stable oscillations | Spiral/Convergence | Learning, Prey + , oscillations | Learning, Pred + , oscillations | Spiral + Predator learning |
Learning | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
S | 0 | 0 | -1 | 1 | 1 |
Α | 0.02 | 0.20 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.50 |
Β | 0.003 | 0.010 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.020 |
ϒ | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.20 |
δ (or δ0 if learning) | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0010 |
L | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.000001 | 0.000400 | 0.005000 |
Nb Prey (initial) | 50 | 100 | 19 | 50 | 100 |
Nb Pred (initial) | 10 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 10 |
Nb periods | 1000 | 1000 | 950 | 810 | 1000 |
Time step | 0.100 | 2.000 | 0.001 | 0.010 | 1.000 |
Number of points | 10000 | 500 | 950000 | 81000 | 1000 |
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Mesly, O., Mavoori, H. & Huck, N. The Role of Financial Spinning, Learning, and Predation in Market Failure. J Knowl Econ 14, 517–543 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-021-00862-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-021-00862-2