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The Effect of Board Director’s Characteristics on Real Earnings Management: Tunisian-Listed Firms

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Abstract

The present research is focused on studying the effect of board director’s characteristics on the real earnings management (management sales manipulation proxy) measured by the abnormal level of operating cash flows. Our empirical study has been conducted on a sample of 29 Tunisian-listed companies over the period ranging from 2009 to 2013. The study finds a negative impact of board size, board independence, and board meetings on the sales manipulation. Concerning the CEO chairman duality, the results show no association with the level of sales management. This leads us to conclude that the board of directors seems to have a significant effect on delimiting the sales management practice.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Sfax, Sfax, Tunisia

    Jamel Chouaibi, Moez Harres & Najet Ben Brahim

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  1. Jamel Chouaibi
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  2. Moez Harres
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  3. Najet Ben Brahim
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Correspondence to Jamel Chouaibi.

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Chouaibi, J., Harres, M. & Ben Brahim, N. The Effect of Board Director’s Characteristics on Real Earnings Management: Tunisian-Listed Firms. J Knowl Econ 9, 999–1013 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-016-0387-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-016-0387-3

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