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How to Coordinate the Networked Enterprise in a Context of Open Innovation? A New Function for Intellectual Property Rights

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Abstract

The networked enterprise simultaneously seeks to develop new knowledge in order to compete on international markets thanks to its innovation capacity and to improve its allocation of resources, notably by reducing its production and organisational costs. In this paper, we study the functions of intellectual property rights in these productive and organisational objectives of the networked enterprise. We consider that they have an important ‘coordination function’, making easier the relationships between the fragmented parts of the networked enterprise. This coordination role is gaining ground in the context of open innovation. It is, thus, associated to the more traditional ‘incentive/defensive’ function of IPRs, which aims at giving incentives to the constitution of the firm’s ‘knowledge capital’. This coordination function is also associated to the ‘offensive’ one, relying on the construction and the reinforcement of entry barriers which contribute to position the firm within the innovation network to which it usually belongs.

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Notes

  1. First posed with the Ronald Coase’s contribution [17], who opposed market and hierarchy.

  2. Including the evolutionist approach, the resource-based theory, the strategic competence-based approach and the social-anthropology of learning approach (see [21]).

  3. Theoretically, the notion of “knowledge capital” is based on the definitions and/or on the economic developments of three key concepts/notions: knowledge, firm and capital (see [42]).

  4. The types of IPRs agreement may depend on the type of commitment between the partners. Whereas licence agreements may be used in exploitation strategies that involve important exchange of information, exploration strategies may rely on lower commitment (as shown by [23] in the case of IBM), notably at the beginning of the project (trade secrets could be used first—however, if from exploration strategies are generated new technological inventions, these ones would surely result in shared patents or cross licences).

  5. A good example of the blocking impact of a patent thicket in the biotechnology sector is the case of the Golden Rice. This variety of rice is produced through genetic engineering to biosynthesize beta-carotene, a precursor of pro-vitamin A in the edible parts of rice. While created at the University of Zurich, Golden Rice uses technological means protected by patents. For its exploitation, licences had to be negotiated with more than 70 patent owners [37]

  6. This was for example the solution chosen to solve the problem of the exploitation of the Golden Rice [9].

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Correspondence to Blandine Laperche.

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Laperche, B. How to Coordinate the Networked Enterprise in a Context of Open Innovation? A New Function for Intellectual Property Rights. J Knowl Econ 3, 354–371 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-011-0052-9

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