Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

The protection of marriage and family: a constitutional responsibility to enable all-embracing interaction as a means without an (objective) end

  • Article
  • Published:
China-EU Law Journal Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The constitutional duty to protect marriage and family is a rather recent task for public authorities. While these particularly personal forms of social interaction have always been of political interest to some extent, the attempt to provide them with basic rights protection against and by the state is a development from the last 100 years. Nowadays, such obligations are anchored not only in the constitutions or in the constitutional practice of virtually all European nation states, but also within the European fundamental rights protection systems as well as on the global level of public international law. Apart from this success story, however, the social phenomena that are being addressed as well as their context have changed considerably in European societies. The historically controversial questions of why and how marriage and family are to be protected by basic rights, therefore have still not been solved completely. This article addresses the history of this young fundamental right as well as different approaches to its interpretation in using the example of the protection clause of the German Basic Law.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. On interaction within marriage and families from a sociological perspective Hill and Kopp 2013, p. 181 et seqq., on the theory of symbolic interactionism p. 81 et seqq.

  2. Translations of German laws, court decisions and legal terms widely rely on Kommers and Miller 2012.

  3. On the debates of the meaning of the Article see Cremer 2014.

  4. Morlok 1993, p. 99 et seq.

  5. On such framing Luhmann 1982; Honneth (2011), p. 230 et seqq.

  6. On the short historical survey presented in this paragraph see in detail and with further references Stern 2006, p. 335 et seqq. (also for older Roman and Germanic law); clearly represented Brosius-Gersdorf (2013), para. 1 et seqq.; in particular on the history of the ideas and institutions of marriage and family Gröschner (2006), para. 7 et seqq.

  7. Until a few years ago mere religious weddings were a misdemeanor in Germany and still they do not cause any legal effect in relation to the state, see Kotzur 2016, para. 22.

  8. See Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 178 et seqq.

  9. Stern 2006, p. 359 with further references.

  10. See Gusy 1997.

  11. Art. 119 Weimar Constitution: (1) Marriage, as the foundation of family life and of the preservation and expansion of the nation, enjoys the special protection of the constitution. It shall rest upon the equality of rights of both sexes. (2) It shall be the duty of the state and of municipalities to maintain the purity, health, and social welfare of the family. Families with many children have a claim to social welfare. (3) Motherhood has a claim to the protection and support of the state (translation quoted from Böckenförde 2017, p. 240, footnote V). Art. 120 to 122 contained provisions about parental rights, the rights of nonmarital children and state responsibility regarding the protection of children.

  12. Summarily (and with further references) on the Basic Law being a reaction to the shortcomings of the Weimar Constitution Heun 2011, p. 17 et seqq.

  13. See particularly the instrument of constitutional complaints by individuals, Art. 93 para. 1 no. 4a Basic Law.

  14. Art. 6 Basic Law: (1) Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state. (2) The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in the performance of this duty. (3) Children may be separated from their families against the will of their parents or guardians only to a law, and only if the parents or guardians fail in their duties or the children are otherwise in danger of serious neglect. (4) Every mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community. (5) Children born outside of marriage shall be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for physical and mental development and for their position in society as are enjoyed by those born within marriage.

  15. The whole Art. states: Marriage, the family, and mother and child are protected by the state. Both husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning. Parents have the duty to rear and educate their minor children, and children who have come of age have the duty to support and assist their parents. Violation of the freedom of marriage is prohibited. Maltreatment of old people, women and children is prohibited. (translation quoted from http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2824.htm).

  16. In detail on development and design of the multilevel protection system Marauhn and Thorn 2013, para. 5 et seqq.

  17. For an overview of the development of international human rights protection after the Second World War Bryde 2004, para. 8 et seqq.

  18. On the (limited) influence of the UDHR on the drafting of Art. 6 Basic Law Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 27.

  19. Art. 12 UDHR: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

    Art. 16 UDHR: (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

    Art. 25 UDHR: (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

  20. See Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 4 et seqq.; especially on the Convention on the Rights of the Children Wapler (2015), p. 234 et seqq.

  21. Art. 8 ECHR: (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

    Art. 12 ECHR: Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.

  22. See Art. 52 para. 3 CFR: „In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.”.

  23. Art. 7 CFR: Everybody has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.

    Art. 9 CFR: The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with national laws governing the exercise of these rights.

  24. On matters of marriage and family see Marauhn and Thorn 2013, para. 24 et seq., 97, 99, with reservations on cases having direct effect on the best interest of the child (para. 24).

  25. However, such conflicts frequently occur with regard to familial, particularly parental, rights, e.g. ECtHR Zaunegger vs. Germany, no. 22028/04, judgment of 3 December 2009. The ECtHR therefore has been called an “engine” of German family law (by Sanders [2016], p. 440, with further example).

  26. Mainly with regard to free movement of EU citizens and their families, but also with regard to third-country-nationals, see Kingreen (2016), para. 7 and 16.

  27. On this from a perspective of multi-level fundamental rights protections see Eßlinger (2018).

  28. Under Art. 81 para. 3 TTEU the adoption of such measures requires unanimity vote by the Council, while determining certain aspects of family law that could be adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure can be vetoed be any member state parliament.

  29. Quoted from the Lisbon Decision of the FCC, see Decisions of the FCC (BVerfGE) 123, 267 (English translation: http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html). On this decision see Kommers and Miller 2012, p. 343 et seqq. (who translate the German original “die Gestaltung der Familien- und Bildungsverhältnisse” [BVerfGE 123, 358] as “family and education policy” [p. 348]); on the decision see the special issue of the German Law Journal 10 (2009) Nr. 8; particularly critical with regard to the field of “culture” Britz 2010, p. 154 et seqq.

  30. On this intention Bernsdorff in Meyer 2014, para. 6 et seqq.

  31. See Brosius-Gersdorf 2013, para. 33.

  32. Gröschner (2006), para. 27 et seq. explains the differences mainly by the cultural imprint of different religious denominations.

  33. For the discussion on whether to combine the right to respect for private and for family life or to establish a separate fundamental right see Bernsdorff (2014), para. 12.

  34. See in detail Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 27 et seqq.

  35. On this also see the survey of Huster 2002, p. 496 et seqq.

  36. Cf. Schwab 1976, p 898 et seqq.

  37. See Marauhn and Thorn 2013, para. 5 et seqq.

  38. Gusy 1997, p. 299. On the history of the adoption Schwab 1976, p. 894 et seqq. and p. 904 et seqq.; Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 36 et seqq.

  39. Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 40.

  40. Schwab 1976, 894 et seqq., 901 et seqq.

  41. For the programmatic norms of the Weimar Constitution in general Bryde 2004, para 18.

  42. See Seiler Art. 6 para. 43 et seqq., also on such views which have not been explicitly expressed (para. 48 et seqq.).

  43. BVerfGE 6, 55, 76.

  44. See Huster 2002 (with regard to the protection of marriage and family p. 488 et seqq.); reservations and explanations with regard to the interpretation of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law as an “objective order of values” Kommers and Miller 2012, p. 45 et seq. and p. 57 et seqq.; on a “neutrality duty” in Art. 6 Basic Law Brosius-Gersdorf 2013, para. 94 and 137.

  45. BVerfGE 6, 55, 81 et seq.; Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 103.

  46. See BVerfGE 53, 224, 245.

  47. Brosius-Gersdorf 2013, para. 43 et seqq.; with some specifying remarks Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 78, 88 et seqq.

  48. See Stern 2006, p. 373.

  49. BVerfGE 105, 3445 et seq. (see Kommers and Miller 2012, p. 606 et seqq.); consenting Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 62, 71 et seqq.; Gröschner (2006), para. 43 et seqq.; dissenting Sanders 2012, p. 930 et seqq; Brosius-Gersdorf 2013, para. 81 (all with further references).

  50. However, as Michael and Morlok 2016, p. 153, rightly distinguish, even the different wording can be considered discriminatory. In fact, the mere justification with regard to the wording or the origin of the norm has historically been complemented by moral positions (even by those, who, e.g. Pawlowski 1983, p. 15, saw the structural parallelism as a chance of individual freedom).

  51. Since BVerfGE 124, 199; see Sanders 2012, p. 925 et seqq.; Kotzur 2016, para. 30 et seqq. Meanwhile, same-sex marriage has been introduced into the German civil code.

  52. Already in its landmark decision mentioned above (BVerfGE 6, 55, 71), but still until today (BVerfGE 132, 273, 342). On this a term Di Fabio 2003, p. 995 with further references.

  53. e.g. Art. 16 para. 3 UDHR.

  54. See Stern 2006, p. 350.

  55. BVerfGE 6, 55, 71. For a short survey of the historical experience Sanders 2012, p. 914, on the role of (private) law and lawyers in that time Rüthers 2012.

  56. Huster 2002, p. 498 et seqq.

  57. Brosius-Gersdorf 2013, para. 129 with further references; as an elaborated approach Brosius-Gersdorf 2011; less prominent in Di Fabio 2003 and Seiler Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 124, 136.

  58. In Art. 49 the proclamation of protection of marriage, the family, and mother and child is followed by this sentence: Both husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning. See also Art. 25: The state promotes family planning so that population growth may fit the plans for economic and social development. See also Art. 89 para. 7, Art. 107 CPRC.

  59. Brosius-Gersdorf (2013), para. 43, 60, 88 and 129, considers this function the reason for a “special protection” of marriage and family (besides its reproductive function).

  60. Steiger 1987; Gröschner (2006), para. 2 et seq.; for family law in general Röthel 2017.

  61. Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 53, who qualifies this finding by saying that the general interest dimension of marriage and family is to be considered.

  62. On this Morlok 1993.

  63. See Marauhn and Thorn 2013, para. 16, 26.

  64. BVerfGE 10, 59, 83.

  65. For this structural difference of the German protection order in comparison with the rights of the ECHR and the CFR see Marauhn and Thorn 2013, para. 18.

  66. On chances of exchange and adjustment of fundamental rights in Europe with regard to the protection of marriage and family Kotzur 2016, para. 7.

  67. Cf. Brosius-Gersdorf 2011.

  68. On this in general Morlok 1993.

  69. In the jurisdiction of the FCC most of such cases concern discrimination issues, cf. Kingreen 1995, p. 77 et seqq.

  70. The FCC considers family (BVerfGE 10, 59, 66) and marriage (BVerfGE 53, 224, 245) as “all embracing” communities. On the possible meaning of this term Sanders 2012, p. 915 et seq.

  71. For a survey of the legal doctrine of Art. 6 para. 1 see Sanders 2012, p. 916 et seqq.; Herzmann 2015; Kingreen and Poscher 2016, p. 180 et seqq.

  72. Mainly with regard to marriage, see Brosius-Gersdorf 2013, para. 77 et seqq.; Kommers and Miller 2012, p. 605 et seqq.

  73. For a doctrinal approach mainly with regard to financial advancement recently Wischmeyer 2015.

  74. On the relation to other constitutional provisions Sanders 2012, p. 918 et seqq.

  75. See Röthel 2017.

  76. While in general the design of a partnership is to a large extent left to the spouses by informal and unenforceable agreements, the financial consequences of marriages have to be formally regulated either by a legal base model or by marital contract (in a nutshell Röthel, Werner and Ludwig, p. 200 et seq., 209 et seqq., also on the German family law’s prohibition on making parental custody subject to contract or any other kind of agreement). By this, the procedural nature of a marriage as an organization of common freedom (Pawlowski 1983) and its possibility of “failed investments” is represented.

  77. With regard to the distinction of “community” and “society” Di Fabio 2003, p. 994 et seq. Critical with regard to a shift from the community-perspective to a mere individualistic perspective on marriage and family Seiler 2014, Art. 6 para. 240 et seqq.

  78. On the need of taking into account the social context of fundamental rights practice Albers 2005, p. 42 et seqq. (with further references).

  79. BVerfGE 76, 1, 45.

  80. On theoretical and methodical limits of family sociology Hill and Kopp 2013, p. 208 et seqq.; with regard to fundamental rights protection in general Ladeur 2011; (to a different degree) inspired by this, but not addressing the problem with regards to the protection of marriage and family, Vesting, Korioth and Augsberg 2014.

  81. Jonathan Safran Foer, Here I am, 2016.

  82. See Gröschner (2006), para. 3.

  83. Cf. Luhmann 1982, p. 197 et seqq.

  84. Morlok 1993, p. 396 („personal belangvolle Freiheit“), for the protection of marriage and family, p. 99 et seqq.

References

  • Albers M (2005) Informationelle Selbstbestimmung. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bernsdorff N (2014) Art 7. In: Meyer J (ed) Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 4th edn. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Böckenförde E-W (2017) Critique of the Value-based Grounding of Law. In: Künkler EW, Stein T (eds) Constitutional and political theory. Selected writings. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Britz G (2010) Vom kulturellen Vorbehalt zum Kulturvorbehalt in der bundesverfassungsgerichtlichen Demokratietheorie des Lissabon-Urteils? Europarecht Beiheft 1:151–170

    Google Scholar 

  • Brosius-Gersdorf F (2011) Demografischer Wandel und Familienförderung. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brosius-Gersdorf F (2013) Art 6. In: Dreier H (ed) Grundgesetzkommentar, vol 1, 3rd edn. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Bryde B-O (2004) Programmatik und Normativität der Grundrechte. In: Merten D, Papier H-J (eds) Handbuch der Grundrechte, vol 1. C. F. Müller, Heidelberg, pp 679–706

    Google Scholar 

  • Cremer W (2014) The basic right to free development of the personality. In: Pünder H (ed) Debates in German public law. Hart, Oxford, pp 57–74

    Google Scholar 

  • Di Fabio U (2003) Der Schutz von Ehe und Familie: Verfassungsentscheidung für die vitale Gesellschaft. In: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, pp 993–998

  • Eßlinger S (2018) Gegenseitiges Vertrauen. Zur grenzüberschreitenden Beurteilung des Grundrechtsschutzes im Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Gröschner R (2006) Art. 6. In: Dreier H (ed) Grundgesetzkommentar, vol 1, 2nd edn. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Gusy C (1997) Die Weimarer Reichsverfassung. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Herzmann K (2015) Der Schutz von Ehe und Familie nach Art. 6 I GG. In: Juristische Ausbildung, pp 248–259

  • Heun W (2011) The Constitution of Germany. Hart, Portland

    Google Scholar 

  • Hill PB, Kopp J (2013) Familiensoziologie. Grundlagen und theoretische Perspektiven, 5th edn. Springer, Wiesbaden

    Google Scholar 

  • Honneth A (2011) Das Recht der Freiheit. Suhrkamp, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Huster S (2002) Die ethische Neutralität des Staates. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Kingreen T (1995) Die verfassungsrechtliche Stellung der nichtehelichen Lebensgemeinschaft im Spannungsfeld zwischen Freiheits- und Gleichheitsrechten. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Kingreen T (2016) Art. 7 GRC. In: Calliess C, Ruffert M (eds) EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtcharta. Kommentar. C. H. Beck, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Kingreen T, Poscher R (2016) Staatsrecht II. Grundrechte, 32nd edn. C. F. Müller, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Kommers DP, Miller RA (2012) The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 3rd edn. Duke University Press, Durham

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kotzur M (2016) Art. 6. In: Stern K, Becker F (eds) Grundrechte-Kommentar, 2nd edn. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladeur K-H (2011) Die Beobachtung der kollektiven Dimension der Grundrechte durch eine liberale Grundrechtstheorie. Der Staat 50:493–531

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Luhmann N (1982) Liebe als Passion. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main

    Google Scholar 

  • Marauhn T, Thorn J (2013) Kapitel 16: Privat- und Familienleben. In: Dörr O, Grote R, Marauhn T (eds) EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, 2nd edn. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Michael L, Morlok M (2016) Grundrechte, 5th edn. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Morlok M (1993) Selbstverständnis als Rechtskriterium. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Pawlowski (1983) Die „Bürgerliche Ehe“als Organisation. Überlegungen zu juristischen Arbeitsmitteln

  • Röthel A (2017) Autonomie im Familienrecht der Gegenwart. Juristenzeitung 72:116–123

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rüthers B (2012) Die unbegrenzte Auslegung. Zum Wandel der Privatrechtsordnung im Nationalsozialismus, 7th edn. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Sanders A (2012) Marriage, same-sex-partnership and the German constitution. Ger Law J 13:911–940

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sanders A (2016) Das Familienrecht in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. In: Familie und Recht, pp 434–440

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schwab D (1976) Zur Geschichte des verfassungsrechtlichen Schutzes von Ehe und Familie. In: Festschrift für Friedrich Wilhelm Bosch zum 65. Geburtstag. Gieseking, Bielefeld, pp 893–907

  • Seiler C (2014) Art. 6. In: Kahl W, Waldhoff C, Walter C (eds) Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (loose leaf system). C. F. Müller, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Steiger H (1987) Verfassungsgarantie und sozialer Wandel – Das Beispiel von Ehe und Familie. Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 45:55–93

    Google Scholar 

  • Stern K (2006) Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol 1. C. H. Beck, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Vesting T, Korioth S, Augsberg I (2014) Grundrechte als Phänomene sozialer Ordnung. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Wapler F (2015) Kinderrechte und Kindeswohl. Eine Untersuchung zum Status des Kindes im Öffentlichen Recht. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Wischmeyer T (2015) Die Kosten der Freiheit. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chair of Public and European Law, University of Giessen, Hein-Heckroth-Str. 5, 35390, Giessen, Germany

    Karsten Herzmann

Authors
  1. Karsten Herzmann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Karsten Herzmann.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Herzmann, K. The protection of marriage and family: a constitutional responsibility to enable all-embracing interaction as a means without an (objective) end. China-EU Law J 6, 189–203 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12689-019-00084-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12689-019-00084-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation