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Enhancement of end-to-end security in advanced metering infrastructure


Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is enabling technology for smart grid and it act as a bridge between cyber and physical systems of the smart grid. The major parts of AMI are cyber systems; hence it’s more vulnerable to attacks. The normal security protection scheme is not suitable for AMI because it consists of computation restricted components such as smart meters. The AMI networks also increase the challenges in the design of common protocol for end-to-end security (E2S) due to interoperability of its components. Data transfer in the AMI system requires E2S protection and security is one of the most challenging in AMI components development and deployment. Motivated by these limitations, the E2S scheme for AMI smart grid is proposed. In the proposed scheme includes the following properties. (i) Protracted publisher key per smart meter that are given by the Head End System (ii) Encryption key for each message sent from smart meter is derived from the publisher key (iii) Authentication of every message sent that consist of identity of smart meter such as Message Authentication Code (MAC). Compare with the existing end-to-end security schemes, the proposed scheme improves the E2S in terms of confidentiality, integrity and authentication with increasing scalability.

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Kalidass, J., Purusothaman, T. & Suresh, P. Enhancement of end-to-end security in advanced metering infrastructure. J Ambient Intell Human Comput (2021).

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  • Cyber physical system
  • Smart grid
  • Advanced metering infrastructure
  • Group key management
  • Message authentication
  • Amalgamation