Abstract
We propose the concept of a pooling fishery system with a competitive sharing rule as a remedy for the tragedy of the commons without the need to consider the free-riding problem or dissatisfaction of more skillful or eager members. Each fisherman receives his share of pooled income according to his level of achievement, relative to those of other members, of pre-agreed common objectives such as the conservation of depleted stocks. After analyzing the system using the game theoretic approach, we examine its performance as a fisheries management system using a computer simulation. In our example, this system was proven to suppress increases in fishing effort by game theoretic interactions among fishermen, to maintain the stock size at a high level, and to increase the average fishing income. Although there is still much scope for improving this system for practical use, the concept of this system has the potential to contribute to the attainment of sustainable fisheries management.
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Osamu Baba, Professor of Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology, for providing a lot of information of the pooling system, and the members of the Yui and Kashimanada Fisheries Cooperative Associations for their sincere cooperation during this research. We also thank Kunio Shirakihara, Professor of Ocean Research Institute, The University of Tokyo, for critical advice about the research. This research was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research C (No. 17580155) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).
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Kaneko, T., Yamakawa, T. & Aoki, I. Fisheries management using a pooling fishery system with a competitive sharing rule as a remedy for the “tragedy of the commons”. Fish Sci 75, 1345–1357 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12562-009-0160-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12562-009-0160-7