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Negotiating in dynamic environments: time-efficient automated negotiations by means of combinatorial auctions

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Abstract

Automated negotiation is an efficient mechanism for the coordination of interests of heterogeneous agents. However, the negotiation procedure requires time which is a scarce resource in dynamic environments that are characterized by rapid and reoccurring changes of external circumstances. To ensure adaptivity, negotiation protocols are needed that are able to find an adjusted consensus in almost real-time. Furthermore, a protocol should achieve a preferably good social welfare and be strategy-proof. In this paper, we discuss three protocols under the consideration of restricted negotiation time and interdependencies: firstly, a protocol drawing on combinatorial auctions, secondly, a protocol drawing on self-selective clustering of agents in combinatorial auctions, and, thirdly, an iterative negotiation protocol as benchmark. The winner determination of a combinatorial auction is \(\mathcal{NP}\)-hard; therefore, we have applied two approximation algorithms as well as an exact optimization method. The computational results indicate that the auction-based protocols are capable of achieving a good welfare performance while being strategy-proof. By applying approximation algorithms for the winner determination, very short runtimes can be achieved. Concluding, the presented protocols fulfill the given criteria and thus constitute a suitable method for negotiations in dynamic environments.

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Notes

  1. With an odd number of agents (like the supposed three or seven agents), there is a single agent that is independent. For instance, supposing three agents, the second agent has no counterpart.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, Holstenhofweg 85, 22043, Hamburg, Germany

    Fabian Lang & Andreas Fink

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  1. Fabian Lang
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  2. Andreas Fink
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Correspondence to Fabian Lang.

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This paper extends the conference paper “A combinatorial auction negotiation protocol for time-restricted group decisions” by F. Lang and A. Fink which appeared in Bouchachia, A. (Ed.), Adaptive and Intelligent Systems—Proceedings of the Second International Conference (ICAIS 2011), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI) 6943, pp. 332–343.

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Lang, F., Fink, A. Negotiating in dynamic environments: time-efficient automated negotiations by means of combinatorial auctions. Evolving Systems 3, 189–201 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12530-012-9056-3

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