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(K)Ein Grund zur Panik?! Gedanken zum Wesen militärischer Innovation am Beispiel der Unterwasserautonomie

  • Heiko Borchert
Essay
  • 77 Downloads

Zusammenfassung

Unbemannte Unterwassersysteme haben einen hohen technischen Stand erreicht, werden von den Seestreitkräften aber erst ansatzweise eingesetzt. Für die umfassendere Akzeptanz dieser Systeme ist ein besseres Verständnis über den damit für Seestreitkräfte erzeugten operativen Mehrwert erforderlich. Dazu ist eine tiefgreifende Auseinandersetzung mit dem Wechselspiel zwischen operativem Bedarf, kultureller Prädisposition, organisatorischen Rahmenbedingungen und technischen Möglichkeiten unerlässlich.

Schlüsselwörter

Militärische Innovation Autonome Systeme Unterwasserkriegführung Maritimes Konfliktbild 

Keep Calm and Carry on?! Undersea Autonomy and the Nature of Military Innovation

Abstract

Navies will not use unmanned underwater systems just because they seem technically feasible. More emphasis needs to be put on the operational benefits generated by the use of these systems. This, in turn, requires a holistic understanding of military innovation that results from the interplay between operational needs, cultural predisposition, organisational complexities, and technical progress.

Keywords

Military innovation Autonomous systems Undersea warfare Maritime conflict picture 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Borchert Consulting & Research AGLuzernSchweiz

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