Robots, Rape, and Representation

Abstract

Sex robots are likely to play an important role in shaping public understandings of sex and of relations between the sexes in the future. This paper contributes to the larger project of understanding how they will do so by examining the ethics of the “rape” of robots. I argue that the design of realistic female robots that could explicitly refuse consent to sex in order to facilitate rape fantasy would be unethical because sex with robots in these circumstances is a representation of the rape of a woman, which may increase the rate of rape, expresses disrespect for women, and demonstrates a significant character defect. Even when the intention is not to facilitate rape, the design of robots that can explicitly refuse consent is problematic due to the likelihood that some users will experiment with raping them. Designing robots that lack the capacity to explicitly refuse consent may be morally problematic depending on which of two accounts of the representational content of sex with realistic humanoid robots is correct.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Notes

  1. 1.

    The only other paper written on this topic of which I am aware is Danaher [8]. This paper, which is excellent, concentrates on the case for the legal prohibition of the rape of robots rather than on the larger questions concerning the ethics of the rape of robots and the ethics of the design of robots that can be raped, which are my focus here. Moreover, Danaher’s paper treats only a subset of the cases that I discuss here.

  2. 2.

    The essays collected in Wilks [20] represent a useful starting point for this larger project.

  3. 3.

    For a discussion of just how much definitional work this minimal claim leaves to be done, see Christina [24].

  4. 4.

    I offer a brief discussion of the issues that might be raised by sentient robots, as well as an explanation as to why I do not consider them at more length in the current manuscript, below.

  5. 5.

    For an introduction to the large literature on this topic see: Cahill [26], Cowling and Reynolds [27], McGlynn and Munro [28], and Wertheimer [29].

  6. 6.

    There is some controversy in the literature regarding whether the harm of rape may be different in cases where the person raped has different attitudes about the significance of sex. For contrasting perspectives see Archard [25] and Wertheimer [29].

  7. 7.

    Such robots might also be vulnerable to forms of sexual abuse other than rape, including psychological abuse.

  8. 8.

    Russell [12] offers some speculations about the issues that may arise should sentient humanoid robots ever be created.

  9. 9.

    It is also possible to imagine people treating such robots in ways that we might consider to be psychologically abusive were such treatment to be directed to a real human being. This behaviour might also be thought to be morally problematic for reasons akin to those I provide below. However, given that my topic is the ethics of the rape of robots, rather than the ethics of our treatment of robots more generally, I have chosen not to discuss this possibility further here.

  10. 10.

    No doubt “male” sexbots will also exist in the future and might be (ab)used by men or women: the company, True Companion, that purports to produce the world’s only commercially available sexbots, also advertises a male robot “Rocky” as well as the more famous female robot Roxxxy. However, the vast majority of Real Dolls produced are shaped like women and purchased by men: Gurley [3] reports that women constitute “less than 10%” of the purchasers of Real Dolls. There is no reason to believe that this will not also be the case with sexbots. Scheutz and Arnold [13] offer some early results on gendered differences in attitudes towards sex robots and report that more than two thirds of their male respondents said that they would use a sex robot while almost two thirds of their female respondents indicated that they would not. For the purposes of this paper I will therefore follow Danaher [8] and assume that the sexbots under discussion are modelled on women and that the “users” of these devices will overwhelmingly be male.

  11. 11.

    As I will discuss further below, this set of behaviours might have been consciously scripted by the robot’s designer who wanted it to be able to cater to those who enjoy rape fantasies. Alternatively, it may emerge as the consequence of other design choices that were not intended to facilitate rape.

  12. 12.

    In adopting this culturally stereotypical account of rape as my paradigmatic case of rape of a robot, I by no means intend to imply that the majority of real rapes fit this model or that rapes that do not are any less rapes by virtue of that fact. Rather, my intention here is to mobilise the strongest possible set of intuitions that this particular scenario would be a case of rape. I consider cases of the rape of a robot that would in fact look more like the majority of real rapes in the following paragraph.

  13. 13.

    Notice also that there is a clear sense in which, it might be argued, a penis shaped dildo represents a man—and an artificial vagina represents a woman—by synecdoche. This is not to deny that many people may make use of dildos without any thought of, or interest in, having sex with men. As I will suggest further below what the object represents is arguably a function of how a relevant community perceives it rather than the intentions of individual users.

  14. 14.

    I believe that this suggestion was made to me independently by both Michael Flood and Catherine Mills in conversation about the topic of this paper.

  15. 15.

    Similarly, Danaher explicitly attempts to distinguish sex robots from sex dolls by insisting that the former must have “some degree of artificial intelligence (i.e. some ability to sense, process and respond to signals in its surrounding environment)” [8].

  16. 16.

    Danaher [8] discusses only the first class of cases.

  17. 17.

    Danaher [8] also treats this claim about causation as one of the main arguments about the topic but is reluctant to endorse it because of the lack of evidence for the claim at the current point. Relatedly, Richardson [38] argues that the sale of robots for sex promotes the sex trade.

  18. 18.

    This literature is so divided that participants in the debate tend to be formed into two mutually opposing camps, each convinced that their views have been thoroughly proven. Consequently, even the claim that the question is contested tends to generate controversy depending on the audience. If my reader is amongst those who believes this question to be settled either way, I would ask him or her to at least acknowledge that the opposing perspective also has a significant number of adherents regardless of the plausibility of their claims.

  19. 19.

    See, for instance, the remarks attributed to Shin Takagi, founder of the Japanese company Trottla, which manufactures lifelike child sized sex dolls, in Morin [46] and to Ron Arkin in Hill [47].

  20. 20.

    My thanks to Brendan Keogh for drawing my attention to this passage.

  21. 21.

    Although it is unlikely that it would render them entirely unproblematic.

  22. 22.

    Richardson [38, p. 192] and Kaye [19] also criticise the use and manufacture of sex robots more generally on this basis.

  23. 23.

    The strongest versions of these arguments, which have been developed in the literature about the ethics of pornography, blur the line between the effects and the content of pornography. According to Catherine MacKinnon [51] and also Rae Langton [50], for instance, pornography just is the subordination and silencing of women. For my purpose here what matters is that these arguments rely on a philosophical claim about the relations between various speech acts rather than on an empirical claim about the social consequences of pornography. For a recent critical discussion of the philosophical claim, see Bauer [53].

  24. 24.

    The discussion that follows assumes that resemblance is primarily a matter of physical resemblance. However, as was pointed out to me by an anonymous reviewer, robots may also represent or resemble things, including individuals, by virtue of their behaviour (for instance, vocal utterances or characteristic movements) or by virtue of the role that they play in the user’s life (for instance, the user’s own psychic identification of them with a particular thing or person). These alternative means by which robots may have representational content complexify but do not fundamentally alter the discussion that follows. In particular, as per the argument below, the ultimate authority as to what a particular robot represents remains society rather than the individual user. For reasons of space, I have chosen not to discuss these alternative mechanisms for representation further in the current context.

  25. 25.

    Moreover, I believe the vast majority of those who witnessed, or learned of, it would identify it as such. The significance of this observation will become clear below.

  26. 26.

    Further—disturbing—evidence in favour of this claim is provided by the fact that at least one sex doll manufacturer offers a “hymen” along with the choice of latex genitals that may be fitted to its dolls. It’s difficult to understand how the concept of virginity in a doll could refer to anything other than virginity in a woman.

  27. 27.

    The existence of the websites http://dollforum.com/ and http://dollbase.org/ suggest that there may be a sizable community of people who fetishize realistic dolls in just this way.

  28. 28.

    Similarly, Stephanie Patridge [54] has argued that representations of activities in virtual worlds have a social meaning that resists the efforts of individuals to alter it through entertaining alternative accounts thereof.

  29. 29.

    As I shall discuss further below, the conclusion that sex with a robot that does not explicitly consent is not rape seems to imply that many sex robots (and also sex dolls), which can’t explicitly refuse consent, cannot be raped—a result that itself has further implications for the ethics of the design of sex robots and sex dolls.

  30. 30.

    Note that, as was already emphasised above, the line of argument developed by MacKinnon and Langton (and others) in debates about pornography does not rely on a claim about the causal power of pornographic representations. Rather, these authors argue that pornography itself constitutes or enacts the subordination, objectification, and/or silencing of woman.

  31. 31.

    It is worth observing that most societies currently maintain a striking double standard when it comes to this question and are much more reluctant to criticise representations of (non-sexual) violence than they are of sexual violence and perhaps sex more generally [60].

  32. 32.

    Similarly, a number of authors have turned to virtue ethics in order to explain what is wrong with playing video and computer games that involve computer-generated representations of violence, rape, and/or paedophilia. See, for instance: Coeckelbergh [65], McCormick [66], Patridge [54], and Sicart [67]. My argument here lends weight to these criticisms. By contrast, Kershnar [68] argues that our enjoyment of fantasies of immoral acts need not reflect poorly on our character.

  33. 33.

    It is, of course, possible that modelling good behaviour with robots might cause us to behave better with real animals (and people). However, my worry here is about the claim that treating robots well could render us virtuous regardless of whether or not it meant that we were more likely to treat people (and animals) well.

  34. 34.

    The design of such a robot would arguably also damage the character of the designer by demonstrating them to have sexist and morally reprehensible attitudes towards women sufficient to constitute a vice.

  35. 35.

    Richardson [38] argues that sex dolls are problematic because they promote the sex trade, while Sullins [15] argues that the design of robots to encourage intimacy is unethical because it involves deception (see also Sparrow [70]). As my own project is to investigate how thinking about the hypothetical rape of robots can illuminate the ethics of their design, I will not attempt to evaluate these other lines of criticism of sexbots here.

  36. 36.

    While other forms of pornography also often represent women as essentially desiring of, and available for, intercourse at all times, this representation takes place only while the viewer or reader of the pornography is viewing or reading it. However, if it is impossible to rape a particular sex robot then for each-and-every moment of its existence this robot represents a woman who cannot be raped.

  37. 37.

    Consequently, unlike in the case where the robot represents a person, there seems to be nothing problematic implying that such robots are always available for sex.

References

  1. 1.

    Perkowitz S (2004) Digital people: from bionic humans to androids. Joseph Henry Press, Washington

    Google Scholar 

  2. 2.

    Lars and the Real Girl (2007) Directed by Craig Gillespie. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer & Sidney Kimmel Entertainment, USA

    Google Scholar 

  3. 3.

    Gurley G (2015) Is this the dawn of the sexbots? Vanity Fair (Online), April 16. http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2015/04/sexbots-realdoll-sex-toys. Accessed 25 March 2016

  4. 4.

    Levy D (2008) Love and sex with robots. Harper Perennial, New York

    Google Scholar 

  5. 5.

    True Companion (2016) http://www.truecompanion.com/. Accessed 22 March 2016

  6. 6.

    Wiseman E (2015) Sex, love and robots: Is this the end of intimacy? The Guardian (Online), 13 December. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/13/sex-love-and-robots-the-end-of-intimacy. Accessed 4 April 2016

  7. 7.

    Borenstein J, Arkin RC (2016) Robots, ethics, and intimacy: the need for scientific research. In: Conference of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (IACAP 2016). Ferrara, IT, June, p 2016

  8. 8.

    Danaher J (2017) Robotic rape and robotic child sexual abuse: should they be criminalised? Crim Law Philos 11(1):71–95

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. 9.

    Hauskeller M (2014) Sex and the posthuman condition. Palgrave Macmillan, UK, Basingstoke

    Google Scholar 

  10. 10.

    Mackenzie R (2014) Sexbots: replacements for sex workers? Ethical constraints on the design of sentient beings for utilitarian purposes. In: Proceedings of the 2014 workshops on advances in computer entertainment conference. ACM, p 8

  11. 11.

    Richardson K (2016) The asymmetrical ’relationship’: parallels between prostitution and the development of sex robots. ACM SIGCAS Comput Soc 45(3):290–293

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. 12.

    Russell ACB (2009) Blurring the love lines: the legal implications of intimacy with machines. Comput Law Secur Rev 25(5):455–463

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. 13.

    Scheutz M, Arnold T (2016) Are we ready for sex robots? http://hrilab.tufts.edu/publications/scheutzarnold16hri.pdf. Accessed 14 May 2016

  14. 14.

    Snell J (2005) Sexbots: an editorial. Psychol Educ 42(1):49–50

    Google Scholar 

  15. 15.

    Sullins JP (2012) Robots, love, and sex: the ethics of building a love machine. IEEE Trans Affect Comput 3(4):398–409

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. 16.

    Whitby B (2012) Do you want a robot lover? The ethics of caring technologies. In: Lin P, Abney K, Bekey G (eds) Robot ethics: the ethical and social implications of robotics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA; London, pp 233–248

    Google Scholar 

  17. 17.

    Breazeal CA (2002) Designing sociable robots. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  18. 18.

    Darling K (2012) Extending legal rights to social robots. Paper presented at the We Robot 2012 conference, Coral Gables, Florida, April 2012. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2044797. Accessed 22 April 2016

  19. 19.

    Kaye L (2016) Challenging sex robots and the brutal dehumanisation of women. Campaign against sex robots. https://campaignagainstsexrobots.org/2016/02/10/challenging-sex-robots-and-the-brutal-dehumanisation-of-women/. Accessed 21 April 2016

  20. 20.

    Wilks Y (ed) (2010) Close engagements with artificial companions: key social, psychological, ethical and design issues. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  21. 21.

    Robertson J (2010) Gendering humanoid robots: robo-sexism in Japan. Body Soc 16(2):1–36

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. 22.

    Webber J (2005) Helpless machines and true loving carers. J Inform Commun Ethics Soc 3(4):209–218

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. 23.

    Goldman A (1977) Plain sex. Philos Public Aff 6:267–287

    Google Scholar 

  24. 24.

    Christina G (2008) Are we having sex now or what? In: Soble A, Power N (eds) The philosophy of sex: contemporary readings, 5th edn. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham

    Google Scholar 

  25. 25.

    Archard D (2007) The wrong of rape. Philos Q 57(228):374–393

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. 26.

    Cahill A (2001) Rethinking rape. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  27. 27.

    Cowling M, Reynolds P (eds) (2004) Making sense of sexual consent. Burlington, Ashgate, Aldershot

    Google Scholar 

  28. 28.

    McGlynn C, Munro VE (eds) (2010) Rethinking rape law: international and comparative perspectives. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  29. 29.

    Wertheimer A (2003) Consent to sexual relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York

    Google Scholar 

  30. 30.

    Kuhse H, Singer P (1990) Individuals, humans and persons: the issue of moral status. In: Singer P, Kuhse H, Buckle S, Dawson K, Kasimba P (eds) Embryo experimentation: ethical, social and legal issues. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 65–75

    Google Scholar 

  31. 31.

    Sparrow R (2012) Can machines be people? Reflections on the turing triage test. In: Lin P, Abney K, Bekey G (eds) Robot ethics: the ethical and social implications of robotics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 301–315

    Google Scholar 

  32. 32.

    Gunkel DJ (2012) The machine question: critical perspectives on AI, robots, and ethics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  33. 33.

    McGregor J (1994) Force, consent, and the reasonable woman. In: Coleman JL, Buchanan AE (eds) In harm’s way: essays in honor of Joel Feinberg. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 231–54

    Google Scholar 

  34. 34.

    Brison SJ (2002) Aftermath: violence and the remaking of a self. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  35. 35.

    Gutiu S (2012) Sex robots and roboticization of consent. Paper presented at the We Robot 2012 conference, Coral Gables, Florida, April 2012. http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-content/2012/01/Gutiu-Roboticization_of_Consent.pdf. Accessed 22 April 2016

  36. 36.

    Buchwald E, Fletcher PR, Roth M (eds) (2005) Transforming a rape culture. Milkweed Editions, Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  37. 37.

    Herman D (1988) The rape culture. Culture 1(10):45–53

    Google Scholar 

  38. 38.

    Richardson K (2015) Sex robots and the sex trade. New Matilda, 28 October. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/10/28/sex-robots-and-the-sex-trade/. Accessed 1 April 2016

  39. 39.

    Commonwealth of Australia (2009) Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department discussion paper: Should the Australian National Classification Scheme include an R18+ classification category for computer games? Attorney General’s Department, Canberra

  40. 40.

    Jenkins H (2012) The war between effects and meaning: rethinking the video game violence debate. In: Buckingham D, Willett R (eds) Digital generations: children, young people, and new media. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, pp 19–32

    Google Scholar 

  41. 41.

    Wright PJ, Tokunaga RS, Kraus A (2016) A meta-analysis of pornography consumption and actual acts of sexual aggression in general population studies. J Commun 66(1):183–205

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. 42.

    Ferguson CJ, Kilburn J (2009) The public health risks of media violence: a meta-analytic review. J Pediatr 154(5):759–763

    Article  Google Scholar 

  43. 43.

    Sherry J (2007) Violent video games and aggression: why can’t we find links? In: Preiss R, Gayle B, Burrell N, Allen M, Bryant J (eds) Mass media effects research: advances through meta-analysis. Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp 231–248

    Google Scholar 

  44. 44.

    Diamond M (2009) Pornography, public acceptance and sex related crime: a review. Int J Law Psychiatry 32(5):304–314

    Article  Google Scholar 

  45. 45.

    Ferguson CJ, Hartley RD (2009) The pleasure is momentary... the expense damnable? The influence of pornography on rape and sexual assault. Aggress Violent Behav 14(5):323–329

  46. 46.

    Morin R (2016) Can child dolls keep paedophiles from offending? The Atlantic, January 11. http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/01/can-child-dolls-keep-pedophiles-from-offending/423324/. Accessed 10 February 2016

  47. 47.

    Hill K (2014) Are child sex-robots inevitable? Forbes.com. Available via http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/14/are-child-sex-robots-inevitable/#1053601f2ddf. Accessed 4 April 2016

  48. 48.

    Dines G (2010) Pornland: how porn has hijacked our sexuality. Beacon Press, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  49. 49.

    Hornsby J (1995) Speech acts and pornography. In: Dwyer S (ed) The problem of pornography. Wadsworth, Belmont, pp 220–232

    Google Scholar 

  50. 50.

    Langton R (1993) Speech acts and unspeakable acts. Philos Public Aff 22(4):293–330

    Google Scholar 

  51. 51.

    MacKinnon C (1995) Only words. Harper Collins, London

    Google Scholar 

  52. 52.

    Dyer-Witheford N, de Peuter G (2009) Games of empire: global capitalism and video games. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  53. 53.

    Bauer N (2015) How to do things with pornography. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, London

    Google Scholar 

  54. 54.

    Patridge S (2010) The incorrigible social meaning of video game imagery. Ethics Inf Technol 13(4):303–312

    Article  Google Scholar 

  55. 55.

    MacKinnon C (1987) Francis Biddle’s sister: pornography, civil rights and speech. Feminism unmodified: discourses on life and law. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 163–197

    Google Scholar 

  56. 56.

    Huizinga J (1949) Homo ludens: a study of the play-element in culture. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  57. 57.

    Salen K, Zimmerman E (2004) Rules of play: game design fundamentals. MIT Press, Cambridge, p 95

    Google Scholar 

  58. 58.

    Gooskens G (2010) The ethical status of virtual actions. Ethical Perspect 17(1):59–78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  59. 59.

    Plato (1974) The Republic. trans Lee HDP, 2nd edn. revised. Penguin, Harmondsworth; Baltimore

  60. 60.

    Luck M (2009) The gamer’s dilemma: an analysis of the arguments for the moral distinction between virtual murder and virtual paedophilia. Ethics Inf Technol 11(1):31–36

    Article  Google Scholar 

  61. 61.

    Oakley J (1992) Morality and the emotions. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  62. 62.

    Hursthouse R (1999) On virtue ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  63. 63.

    Russell DC (ed) (2013) The Cambridge companion to virtue ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford

  64. 64.

    Corvino J (2002) Naughty fantasies. Southwest Philos Rev 18(1):213–220

    Article  Google Scholar 

  65. 65.

    Coeckelbergh M (2007) Violent computer games, empathy, and cosmopolitanism. Ethics Inf Technol 9(3):219–231

    Article  Google Scholar 

  66. 66.

    McCormick M (2001) Is it wrong to play violent video games? Ethics Inf Technol 3(4):277–287

    Article  Google Scholar 

  67. 67.

    Sicart M (2009) The ethics of computer games. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  68. 68.

    Kershnar S (2008) Rape fantasies and virtue. Public Aff Q 22(3):253–268

    Google Scholar 

  69. 69.

    Sparrow R (2015) Robots in aged care: a dystopian future? AI Soc 31(4):445–454

    Article  Google Scholar 

  70. 70.

    Sparrow R (2002) The march of the robot dogs. Ethics Inf Technol 4(4):305–318

    Article  Google Scholar 

  71. 71.

    Sparrow R, Sparrow L (2006) In the hands of machines? The future of aged care. Minds Mach 16:141–161

    Article  Google Scholar 

  72. 72.

    Mellgard P (2015) As sexbot technology advances, ethical and legal questions linger. The Huffington Post: Australia, 22 September. http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/robot-sex_us_55f979f2e4b0b48f670164e9?section=australia. Accessed 4 April 2016

  73. 73.

    Yeoman I, Mars M (2012) Robots, men and sex tourism. Futures 44(4):365–371

    Article  Google Scholar 

  74. 74.

    Miller DP, Nourbakhsh IR, Siegwart R (2008) Robots for education. In: Siciliano B, Khatib O (eds) Springer handbook of robotics. Springer, Berlin, pp 1283–1301

    Google Scholar 

  75. 75.

    Fujita M, Kitano H (1998) Development of an autonomous quadruped robot for robot entertainment. Auton Robots 5(1):7–18

    Article  Google Scholar 

  76. 76.

    Broekens J, Heerink M, Rosendal H (2009) Assistive social robots in elderly care: a review. Gerontechnology 8(2):94–103

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Selma Sabanovic and Ana Paiva for the invitation to present a keynote lecture at the HRI 2016 conference in Auckland, which prompted me to begin writing this paper. I am grateful to Ron Arkin, Michael Flood, Catherine Mills, and Matthias Scheutz, for comments and discussion early in the development of this manuscript and to Daniel Black, Michael Flood, Rebecca Harrison, Catherine Mills, Nanette Ryan, David Simpson, and Bob Simpson for comments on various drafts. Jonathan Herington was kind enough to draw my attention to two important sources that I had, criminally, missed. I would also like to thank Mark Howard for his work as a research assistant in support of the publication of this manuscript. The research for this paper was supported under the Australian Research Council’s Centres of Excellence funding scheme (project CE140100012). The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Australian Research Council.

Funding The research for this paper was supported under the Australian Research Council’s Centres of Excellence funding scheme (project CE140100012).

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Robert Sparrow.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Sparrow, R. Robots, Rape, and Representation. Int J of Soc Robotics 9, 465–477 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12369-017-0413-z

Download citation

Keywords

  • Robots
  • Sex robots
  • Ethics
  • Rape
  • Representation
  • HRI