Subjects and Objects: Metaphysics, Biology, Consciousness, and Cognition

Abstract

Over the past half-century, the Freeman laboratory has accumulated a large volume of data and a correspondingly extensive interpretive framework centered around an alternative perspective on brain function, that of dynamical systems. The purpose of this paper is first briefly to summarise this work, and bring it into dialogue with other perspectives. The contents of consciousness are seen as an inevitably sparse sample of events in the perception–action cycle. The paper proceeds to an attempt to elucidate the contents of this sparse sample. A critical concept is that of selfhood, and how it presents itself phenomenologically. It is argued that our experience of selfhood is an artifact of the necessity of preservation of subject/object relations. As this part of metaphysics has been badly misunderstood, we scrutinise it at some length in quantum mechanics, biology, and cognition. It is argued that Pattee's approach, while valuable, tends to premature closure on these issues. The paper then proceeds to outline a view on how selfhood is best considered wrt the immune response. This is interrelated with phenomenology, and some data are adduced to support this central hypothesis. Finally, consequences for the social sciences in general are hinted at.