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Föderalismus in Demokratien und Autokratien – Vereinbarkeiten, Spannungsfelder und Dynamiken

Federalism in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes: Compatibilities, Tensions, and Dynamics

Zusammenfassung

Föderalismus wird als förderlich für Demokratie und als unvereinbar mit Autokratie betrachtet. In Demokratien soll Föderalismus die Macht des Staates begrenzen und der Bürgerschaft mehr Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten bieten. Beides lassen autokratische Regierungen nicht zu. Der Beitrag geht davon aus, dass das Verhältnis zwischen diesen drei Strukturelementen komplexer ist als vielfach angenommen. Föderalismus erzeugt in Demokratien wie Autokratien Spannungen zwischen Institutionen und Akteuren, die die Funktionsweise und Dynamik des politischen Systems beeinflussen. Die Beziehungen zwischen Föderalismus, Demokratie und Autokratie können dadurch genauer bestimmt werden, dass strukturelle Dilemmata und Dynamiken in „mehrdimensionalen“ Regierungssystemen berücksichtigt werden. Der Beitrag identifiziert formale und informale Muster, welche die (Un-)Vereinbarkeit zwischen Demokratie und Föderalismus erzeugen oder aber autokratische Tendenzen verstärken. Umgekehrt werden Demokratisierungspotenziale des Föderalismus in nicht-demokratischen Systemen herausgearbeitet. Als Fallbeispiele dienen der kanadische und der russische Föderalismus.

Abstract

Federalism is considered to be conducive to democracy and incompatible with autocracy. In democracies, federalism is established to limit state power and to augment citizens’ opportunities to participate. Authoritarian regimes allow neither. Our paper assumes that the relationship between these three structural components is more complex than commonly supposed. In both autocracies and democracies, federalism generates tension between institutions and actors which impacts on the functioning and the dynamics of the political systems. By taking into account structural dilemmas and dynamics in ‘multidimensional’ systems, the interrelation between federalism on the one hand and democratic or authoritarian regimes on the other hand can be assessed more accurately. This article identifies formal and informal patterns that create (in-)compatibilities between democracy and federalism or that reinforce authoritarian tendencies. Subsequently, it elaborates the potential of federalism to enhance democracy in non-democratic countries. The article draws on the examples of Canadian and Russian federalism.

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Notes

  1. Einen Überblick über unterschiedliche Versuche, Autokratien zu typologisieren, bieten Kailitz und Köllner (2013, S. 10–14). Unser Untersuchungsinteresse richtet sich konzeptionell auf autoritäre, nicht jedoch auf totalitäre Autokratien.

  2. Die RSFSR bestand aus 21 Republiken, 6 Regionen (kraj), 49 Gebieten (oblasti), einem autonomen jüdischen Gebiet, zehn autonomen Bezirken und den zwei bundesbedeutsamen Städten Moskau und St. Petersburg. Heute gibt es 83 „Föderationssubjekte“.

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Benz, A., Kropp, S. Föderalismus in Demokratien und Autokratien – Vereinbarkeiten, Spannungsfelder und Dynamiken. Z Vgl Polit Wiss 8, 1–27 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-014-0179-8

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Schlüsselwörter

  • Föderalismus
  • Demokratie
  • Autokratie
  • Kanada
  • Russland

Keywords

  • Federalism
  • Democracy
  • Authoritarianism
  • Canada
  • Russia