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The Legacy of Landlords: Educational Distribution and Development in a Comparative Perspective

  • Tim WegenastEmail author
AufsÄtze

Abstract

This paper shows that differences in educational outcomes within and between Asia and Latin America are caused in part by the type of agricultural production system. It is argued that, in contrast to states organized around family farming, countries exhibiting plantation-style agriculture tend to neglect broadly based educational policies. Plantation owners may have curtailed educational expansion to impede political mobilization of rural workers in order to secure a cheap supply of hired labour and monopolize the political arena. Results of panel data analysis as well as OLS cross-sectional regressions show that the export of crops grown on large landholdings substantially decreases secondary education attainment levels and governments’ investments in secondary schooling. Simultaneously, these same exports are associated with higher tertiary education levels. The quantitative analysis is complemented by historical evidence of agrarian elites attempting to hinder the development of mass schooling in many countries.

Keywords

Education Plantation economies Agrarian elites Inequality 

Das Vermächtnis der Plantagenwirtschaft: Bildungsungleichheiten und Entwicklung in einer vergleichenden Perspektive

Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass Bildungsunterschiede zwischen und innerhalb Asien und Lateinamerikas zum Teil auf unterschiedliche landwirtschaftliche Produktionssysteme zurückzuführen sind. Im Gegensatz zu Ländern, deren Agrarproduktion hauptsächlich auf landwirtschaftlichen Kleinbetrieben beruht, tendieren Plantagenwirtschaften dazu, eine umfassende Bildung ihrer Bevölkerung zu vernachlässigen. Großgrundbesitzer haben sich gegen eine breite Bildungsexpansion gewehrt, um die politische Mobilisierung von Agrararbeitern zu verhindern und somit die Bereitstellung billiger Arbeitskräfte und das Monopol über den politischen Entscheidungsfindungsprozess sicher zu stellen. Ergebnisse einer gepoolten Zeitreihen- und Querschnittsanalyse deuten darauf hin, dass der Export von Plantagenprodukten sowohl die Sekundarbildungsabschlüsse als auch die Sekundarbildungsausgaben eines Landes verringert. Gleichzeitig wird diese Exportkategorie mit mehr Hochschulausbildung in Verbindung gebracht. Die quantitative Analyse wird um historische Evidenz für den Widerstand der Agrareliten gegen die Entwicklung einer umfangreichen Schulausbildung ergänzt.

Schlüsselwörter

Bildung Plantagenwirtschaft Agrareliten Ungleichheit 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)HamburgGermany

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