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Determinanten der Regierungsbeständigkeit – Eine Event-History-Analyse von 40 parlamentarischen Demokratien

  • Sebastian Jäckle
Aufsätze

Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Aufsatz widmet sich dem Thema Regierungsbeständigkeit in parlamentarischen Demokratien. Ausgehend von der Feststellung, dass es eine große Varianz zwischen den Regierungsdauern einzelner Länder gibt, wird zunächst die bisherige Literatur zu diesem Thema speziell nach der verwendeten Methodik hin untersucht. Hierbei kristallisiert sich die Event History Analysis allgemein und das Cox-Modell im speziellen als besonders gewinnversprechend heraus. Mit Hilfe dieses Modells werden im Anschluss die für das Regierungsscheitern relevanten Attribute an Hand eines neuen Datensatzes, primär bestehend aus Regierungs- und Wahldaten für 40 Länder, identifiziert. Unter anderem lassen sich Einflüsse der Anzahl, der ideologischen Ausrichtung und der Polarisation von Parlamentsparteien und im Kabinett vertretenen Parteien ausmachen. Auch die Art der Regierung spielt für deren Beständigkeit eine Rolle. Erstmals wird vergleichend getestet ob Parlaments- oder Regierungscharakteristika einen größeren Einfluss auf die Regierungsdauer haben.

Schlüsselwörter

Regierung Überleben Ereignisdatenanalyse Parlamentarische Demokratien 

Determinants of government durability – An event history analysis of 40 parliamentary democracies

Abstract

This article deals with the question of governmental durability in parliamentary democracies. Based on the finding of a large variance between the governmental durations in different countries, the existing literature has been examined particularly with regard to the methodology used. Event history analysis in general and the Cox-model in particular produce the best results for such studies. Therefore, this approach is applied for the analysis of several indicators for government termination using a new data set on governments and elections consisting of 40 countries. The effects of the number, the ideological positions, and the polarization of the parties in parliament and of the cabinet members emerge as significant factors for determining government duration, along with the type of government in question. For the first time, an adequate test will be conducted to investigate whether the parliamentary or the governmental attributes have greater influence on the endurance of governments.

Keywords

Government Survival Event history analysis Parliamentary democracies 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für politische WissenschaftHeidelbergDeutschland

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