A survey on authentication and access control for mobile networks: from 4G to 5G


The next generation of mobile networks, 5G, is expected to support a set of multiple requirements and use cases that will create an improved user experience. 5G will also be able to provide a high level of security by considering a variety of security aspects, such as authentication and access control mechanisms. The current protocol in 4G designed to address security is 4G AKA. It presents some weaknesses and vulnerabilities that negatively affect operators’ networks and their subscribers’ security. In designing an authentication and access control mechanism for 5G, it is crucial to evaluate both 4G AKA’s weaknesses and the new requirements of 5G. In this paper, we survey the vulnerabilities of the 4G AKA protocol, as well as the current 5G architectural answers brought by the 3GPP.

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Correspondence to Shanay Behrad.

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Behrad, S., Bertin, E. & Crespi, N. A survey on authentication and access control for mobile networks: from 4G to 5G. Ann. Telecommun. 74, 593–603 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12243-019-00721-x

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  • 5G, mobile network
  • Authentication and access control
  • AKA protocol