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Reaching for the stars: the appointment of celebrities to corporate boards

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Abstract

For a sample of over 700 celebrity appointments to corporate boards of directors over the period 1985–2006, we find positive excess market returns at the time of their announcement. The 1-, 2-, and 3-year long-run performance of the appointing firms provide corroborating evidence of the value of these appointments. We conclude that the appointment of celebrities as directors increase a firm’s visibility in a fashion consistent with Merton’s (J Finance 42:483–510, 1987) investor recognition hypothesis.

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Notes

  1. Other studies also contend visible firms are those with greater analyst coverage intensity and institutional ownership (e.g., O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Falkenstein 1996; Lang et al. 2003).

  2. The following Web site provides information about the Google search engine: www.google.com/intl/en/about.html.

  3. The Google searches were run on different days during March 2008 to partially control for variation in information that might be available at any given point in time.

  4. For this matching sample, we start from the bottom of the adjusted Google hits list. Starting with the bottom 5,000 + director/firms, we identify director appointment announcement dates. We are able to find 1,787 related director appointment announcements for our matching sample. Then, we use the following matching criteria to find a match for each celebrity: (1) a director from the matched sample has to have her or his director appointment in the same year as the celebrity director appointment, (2) the matching director also needs to be in the same industry as the celebrity director (we initially use 4-digit SIC, and then relax this requirement to 3-, 2-, and then 1-digit SIC, until a match is found), and then finally (3), the matching director needs to be affiliated to a firm of a similar size at the end of the fiscal year prior to the celebrity announcement year (we use a 20% range to find this firm size match, but if there are multiple potential matches for one celebrity sample, we pick the closest firm size).

  5. More specifically, we estimate the following regression for three alternative holding periods ([+1, +12], [+1, +24], [+1, +36]) following the celebrity appointment:

    $$ r_{i,t} - rf_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_{1} EXRET_{t} + \beta_{2} SIZE_{t} + \beta_{3} HML_{t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} $$

    i and t are firm and time (monthly) indexes. r, rf, EXRET, SIZE, HML are monthly stock return, risk-free rate, market excess return, size portfolio return, book-to-market portfolio returns. rf, EXRET, SIZE, and HML are from Kenneth French’s Web site. Monthly abnormal returns are captured by α.

  6. For example, see Shores (1990), Skinner (1990), O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), Brennan and Hughes (1991), Lang and Lundholm (1993), Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) and Lang, et al. (2003).

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Correspondence to Stephen P. Ferris.

Appendix

Appendix

This appendix provides a sample of the celebrity directors contained in our study. We report celebrity names, their former or current occupations, the year they were appointed to the board, the appointing firm, and the industry of the appointing firm. Note: Some celebrity directors may be the directors of more than one firm.

 

Celebrity Name

Occupation

Appointed

Firm

Industry

Lyoyd Bentsen

Former U.S. Senator and U.S. vice presidential candidate

1995

Ivax

Generic pharmaceutical products

Nicholas F. Brady

Former U.S. Secretary of Treasury

1993

Heinz (H.J.)

Food manufacturer (e.g., ketchup)

Richard B. Cheney

Former U.S. vice president

1993

Procter & Gamble

Consumer products

Deepak Chopra

Physician, philosopher, best-selling author

2004

Men’s Wearhouse Inc

Men’s suits, other clothing

Warren Christopher

Former U.S. Secretary of State

1997

Edison International

Utilities (electrical)

Elizabeth Dole

Former governor, wife of U.S. Presidential candidate

2000

Gateway

Computers, electronics

Gerald R. Ford

Former U.S. President

1994

Alexander & Alexander Services

Financial services

Robert M. Gates

U.S. Secretary of Defense

2003

Brinker International

Restaurant operator (e.g., Chili’s Bar and Grill)

Evander Holyfield

Former professional boxer

1998

Coca-Cola Bottling

Soft drink manufacturer

Billie Jean King

Former professional tennis player

1999

Altria Group

Tobacco (formerly Philip Morris)

Nancy Lopez

Former professional golfer

2006

The J. M. Smucker Co.

Food manufacturer (e.g., jam)

Walter F. Mondale

Former U.S. vice president

1997

Northwest Airlines

Airline

Sam Nunn

Former U.S. Senator

1999

Dell Computer

Computers, electronics

H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Army General

1996

Home Shopping Network

Retail

Brent Scowcroft

Former U.S. National Security Advisor, Lieutenant General

1993

Pennzoil-Quaker State

Oil, commercial lubricants

George P. Shultz

Former U.S. Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and State

1996

Gilead Sciences

Biopharmaceutical company

Tommy Thompson

Former Governor, former Secretary of Health & Human Services

2005

Centene Corp.

Financial services

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Ferris, S.P., Kim, K.A., Nishikawa, T. et al. Reaching for the stars: the appointment of celebrities to corporate boards. Int Rev Econ 58, 337–358 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-011-0139-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-011-0139-4

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