For a sample of over 700 celebrity appointments to corporate boards of directors over the period 1985–2006, we find positive excess market returns at the time of their announcement. The 1-, 2-, and 3-year long-run performance of the appointing firms provide corroborating evidence of the value of these appointments. We conclude that the appointment of celebrities as directors increase a firm’s visibility in a fashion consistent with Merton’s (J Finance 42:483–510, 1987) investor recognition hypothesis.
Directors Celebrities Governance Boards
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