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International Review of Economics

, Volume 58, Issue 4, pp 337–358 | Cite as

Reaching for the stars: the appointment of celebrities to corporate boards

  • Stephen P. FerrisEmail author
  • Kenneth A. Kim
  • Takeshi Nishikawa
  • Emre Unlu
Article

Abstract

For a sample of over 700 celebrity appointments to corporate boards of directors over the period 1985–2006, we find positive excess market returns at the time of their announcement. The 1-, 2-, and 3-year long-run performance of the appointing firms provide corroborating evidence of the value of these appointments. We conclude that the appointment of celebrities as directors increase a firm’s visibility in a fashion consistent with Merton’s (J Finance 42:483–510, 1987) investor recognition hypothesis.

Keywords

Directors Celebrities Governance Boards 

JEL Classification

G30 G34 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephen P. Ferris
    • 1
    Email author
  • Kenneth A. Kim
    • 2
  • Takeshi Nishikawa
    • 3
  • Emre Unlu
    • 4
  1. 1.Trulaske College of BusinessUniversity of MissouriColumbiaUSA
  2. 2.School of BusinessRenmin University of ChinaBeijingChina
  3. 3.The Business SchoolUniversity of Colorado at DenverDenverUSA
  4. 4.College of Business AdministrationUniversity of Nebraska-LincolnLincolnUSA

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