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Social sciences and neuroscience: a circular integration

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Abstract

Social phenomena can be described and explained through different levels of analysis, which correspond to the theoretical and methodological domains of different disciplines. According to a hierarchy of disciplines which moves from high-order to low-order levels, collective phenomena should be grounded on individual mental processes which, in turn, should rely on brain processes. The crucial question is whether the neuroscientific account of brain processes can be conceived as equivalent to the psychological account of mental processes. It is argued against the complete equivalence of the two kinds of accounts. However, it is maintained that a specific contribution can derive from each discipline so to provide an advance in understanding. It is questioned which could be the better way for psychology and neuroscience to inform each other. It is suggested that knowledge coming from the two disciplines, rather than being simply juxtaposed, should be integrated so to allow each discipline to give and receive insight to/from the other one.

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Correspondence to Alessandro Antonietti.

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Special issue based on the 2nd CISEPS Workshop ‘Social sciences and neuroscience: How can they inform each other?’ Milano, 10 December 2010.

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Antonietti, A., Iannello, P. Social sciences and neuroscience: a circular integration. Int Rev Econ 58, 307–317 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-011-0132-y

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