Abstract
In financial games requiring to take into account the reciprocal benefits, mind-reading—that is, trying to identify other people’s thoughts—is involved. Mind-reading may occur through either analytical or intuitive strategies. Two studies were carried out to deepen the role of analytical and intuitive modes of thinking in mind-reading in financial decision making. Employing the Ultimatum Game as a setting suitable for researching into these topics, we found that the sums of money offered by undergraduates were modulated depending both on the psychological portraits of the responders and on the two modes of thinking. Specifically we found that the sums of money the undergraduates offered varied consistently across the two studies according to specific responder’s psychological features such as honesty, sense of justice, personal dignity. As for the two modes of thinking, it turned out that in the intuitive task proposers offered larger amount of money than in the analytical task.
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Iannello, P., Antonietti, A. Reciprocity in financial decision making: intuitive and analytical mind-reading strategies. Int. Rev. Econ. 55, 167–184 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-007-0031-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-007-0031-4