Abstract
To solve the problem of supply chain management and decision-making under the restriction of the government and social group, we use the cooperative game theory method to seek a way to develop the enterprise. According to the general market competition in game analysis for product manufacturing enterprises as representatives for further discussion under the constraints of the government and social consumer groups, we examine the dynamic decision-making process of supply chain management, the attitudes adopted by the enterprises toward the government and consumer groups in the game for obtaining greater benefits, and the development of enterprises for providing creativity as well as theory and methodology.
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Abbreviations
- c f :
-
The fixed cost of unit product
- c v :
-
The variable cost of unit product
- c i :
-
The unit variable cost when providing the product
- ci,o :
-
The fixed costs of production
- D :
-
Manufacturer’s forecast of product demand
- e :
-
The sum of funds and manpower invested by the government
- E[Co.]:
-
The total expected return that an enterprise obtains in market activities
- Ei [Co.]:
-
The expected return of an enterprise under constraints
- E[Govt.]:
-
The total expected benefit that the government obtains in market activities
- Ei [Govt.]:
-
The expected benefit of the government under constraints
- E[Cons.]:
-
The total expected benefit that consumer groups obtain in market activities
- Ei [Cons.]:
-
The expected benefit of consumer groups under constraints
- F(e):
-
The expected benefit to consumer groups after the government takes measures
- G(p, q, t):
-
The benefit function brought by the product price, quantity and quality when consumer groups buy products
- H(xi, qi):
-
Consumer group benefit function from enterprises fulfilling their social responsibilities
- m :
-
The proportion of high-end consumers who purchase high-end products in the market to the total number of high-end consumers
- n :
-
The proportion of low-end consumers who purchase low-end products in the market to the total number of low-end consumers
- p :
-
Product price
- q :
-
Production output
- q o :
-
Actual production of products on market demand
- q i :
-
The number of products produced by a single enterprise
- Q :
-
The total volume of products provided by enterprises
- S(qi):
-
The level of grade developed by the government
- t i :
-
The integrated utility of product
- T(xi):
-
The distribution function of the reward or punishment on enterprises developed by the government
- U :
-
Expected benefits of manufacturers
- W(e):
-
The expected benefit obtained after the government takes some measures
- x i :
-
The degree of social responsibility performed by enterprises
- X 0 :
-
Government tolerance of the enterprise
- X̄ :
-
The upper limit of the government’s reward or punishment on enterprises
- X̲ :
-
The lower limit of the government’s reward or punishment on enterprises
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Foundation item: the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71801224), the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (No. ZR2017MG017), and the Soft Science Research Program of Shandong Province (No. 2019RKE28015)
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Lü, X., Ding, H. & Quan, L. Research on a Dynamic Decision Mechanism of Demand Oriented Supply Chain Cooperation Behavior. J. Shanghai Jiaotong Univ. (Sci.) 25, 127–136 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12204-020-2157-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12204-020-2157-4