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Formal analysis of authentication in 802.11i

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Abstract

Authentication is the basis of the security of IEEE 802.11i standard. The authentication process in 802.11i involves two important protocols: a 4-way handshake and a group key handshake. A formal analysis of authentication in 802.11i is given via a belief multisets formalism. The analysis shows that the 4-way handshake and the group key handshake may provide satisfactory mutual authentication, key management, and issue of a new group temporal key from an access point to a user device, under the guarantee of mutual possession of a confidential pairwise master key. The analysis also shows that there exists a denial of service attack in the 4-way handshake and some seeming redundancies are useful in the protocol implementation.

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Correspondence to Ling Dong  (董 玲).

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Foundation item: the National High Technology Research and Development Program (863) of China (No. 2006AA01Z422) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 60573030, 90704004)

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Dong, L., Chen, Kf. & Lai, Xj. Formal analysis of authentication in 802.11i. J. Shanghai Jiaotong Univ. (Sci.) 14, 122–128 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12204-009-0122-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12204-009-0122-3

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