Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Using property rights to fight crime: the Khaya Lam project

  • Published:
Journal of Economics and Finance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This article has been updated

Abstract

Despite it being legal in South Africa to acquire a title deed to a government-issued home, roughly 20 million South Africans do not hold title to their property. Millions of homes are eligible to have ownership transferred from the government to the individuals living in them, but legal costs and lack of awareness keep these renters from going through the steps to secure title deeds. Though they may occupy the property for years, without a title deed South Africans are unable, under the law, to make improvements to the property, sell it, or leave it to heirs. The government can seize the property at any time. The Khaya Lam project began in 2013 in an effort to streamline the title deed process and cover legal costs and has teamed up with municipalities to issue almost ten thousand deeds to date. The expansion of property rights are a positive shock to wealth, which can affect investment in security, but could also create opportunities for more crime. This article employs the Synthetic Control Method to understand the relationship between securing property rights and crime.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9
Fig. 10
Fig. 11
Fig. 12
Fig. 13
Fig. 14
Fig. 15
Fig. 16
Fig. 17
Fig. 18

Similar content being viewed by others

Change history

  • 24 June 2023

    Update on the year and volume number in the running head.

Notes

  1. Unfortunately, crime statistics are unavailable prior to 2006 at the municipal level. It is a limitation of this analysis, as the synthetic control method benefits from long pre-treatment periods.

  2. In South Africa, “coloured” is a term used as an ethnic label for people of mixed ethnic origin, including Khoisan, African, Malay, Chinese, and white (Oxford Dictionary)

  3. Beyers Naude, Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Theewaterskloof

  4. Beaufort West, Bergrivier, Bitou, Breede Valley, Cederberg, Drakenstein, George, Hessequa, Johannesburg, Jozini, Kannaland, Kynsna, Laingsburg, Matzikama, Moqhaka, Nkomazi, Oudtshoorn, Saldanha Bay, Swartland, Tshwane, Witzenberg

  5. Other donor pool groups, like neighboring municipalities and municipalities in the same province were also considered. The results are consistent and available upon request.

  6. Upon further investigation, it is not immediately clear what attributed to the crime spike in 2017 in Ngwathe

References

  • Abadie A, Diamond A, Hainmueller J (2010) Synthetic control methods for comparative case studies: estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control program. J Am Stat Assoc 105(490):493–505

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Abadie A, Diamond A, Hainmueller J (2015) Comparative politics and the synthetic control method. Am J Polit Sci 59(2):495–510

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Abadie A, Gardeazabal J (2003) The economic costs of conflict: a case study of the Basque country. Am Econ Rev 93(1):113–132

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allen DW (2015) On Hodgson on property rights. J Inst Econ 11 (4):711–717

    Google Scholar 

  • Aragòn FM, Molina O, Outes-Leòn IW (2020) Property rights and risk aversion: evidence from a titling program. World Dev, 134

  • Besley T (1995) Property rights and investment incentives: theory and evidence from Ghana. J Polit Econ 103(5):903–937

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Billmeier A, Nannicini T (2013) Assessing economic liberalization episodes: a synthetic control approach. Rev Econ Stat 95(3):983–1001

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bjerk D (2010) Thieves, thugs, and neighborhood poverty. J Urban Econ, 68(3)

  • Cai M, Murtazashvili J, Murtazashvili I (2020) The politics of land property rights. J Inst Econ 16(2):151–167

    Google Scholar 

  • Cavallo E, Galiani S, Noy L, Pantano J (2013) Catastrophic natural disasters and economic growth. Rev Econ Stat 95(5):1549–1561

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cole DH (2015) Economic property rights as ‘nonsense upon stilts’: a comment on Hodgson. J Inst Econ 11(4):725–730

    Google Scholar 

  • Cook P, MacDonald J (2011) Public safety through private actions: an economic assessment of BIDs, locks, and citizen cooperation. Econ J 121 (552):445–462

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cousins B, Cousins T, Hornby D, Kingwill R, Royston L, Smit W (2005) Will formalising property rights reduce poverty in South Africa’s ’second economy’?. PLAAS Policy Brief 18:1–6

    Google Scholar 

  • Cunnigham S, Shah M (2018) Decriminalizing indoor prostitution: implications for sexual violence and public health. Rev Econ Stud 85(3):1683—1715

    Google Scholar 

  • De Soto H (2000) The mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails everywhere else. Basic Books

  • Donohue JJ, Aneja A, Weber KD (2019) Right-to-carry laws and violent crime: a comprehensive assessment using penal data and a state-level synthetic control analysis. J Empir Leg Stud 16(2):198–247

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franklin S (2020) Enabled to work: the impact of government housing on slum dwellers in South Africa. J Urban Econ, 118

  • Free Market Foundation (2020) The Khaya Lam Project. Free Market Foundation, South Africa

    Google Scholar 

  • Freedman M, Owens E (2011) Low-income housing development and crime. J Urban Econ, 70

  • Gautier P, Siegmann A, Van Vuuren A (2009) Terrorism and attitudes toward minorities: the effect of the Theo van Gogh murder on house prices in Amsterdam. J Urban Econ 65(2):113–126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glaeser E, Sacerdote B, Scheinkman J (1996) Crime and social interactions. Q J Econ, 111(2)

  • Goin D, Rudolph K, Ahern J (2017) Impact of drought on crime in California: a synthetic control approach. Plos One, 12(10)

  • Grier K, Maynard N (2016) The economic consequences of Hugo-Chavez: a synthetic control analysis. J Econ Behav Organ 125:1–21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harrendorf S, Heiskanen M, Malby S (2010) International statistics on crime and justice. Eur Ins Crime Prev Control

  • Hodgson GM (2015) Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights. J Inst Econ 11(4):683–709

    Google Scholar 

  • Huchzermeyer M (2005) Housing for the poor? Negotiated housing policy in South Africa. Habitat Int 25(3):303–331

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lawson R, Grier K, Absher S (2019) You say you want a (rose) revolution? the effects of Georgia’s 2004 market reforms. Econ Transit Inst Chang 27(1):2301–323

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McNulty T, Holloway S (2000) Race, crime, and public housing in Atlanta: testing a conditional effect hypothesis. Soc Forces 79(2):707–729

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meeks R (2018) Property rights and water access: evidence from land titling in rural Peru. World Dev 102:345–357

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Montalvo J (2011) Voting after the bombings: a natural experiment on the effect of terrorist attacks on democratic elections. Rev Econ Stat 93(4):1146–1154

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muñoz Mora JC, Tobòn S, D’ Anjou JW (2018) The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops: evidence from Colombia. World Dev 103:268–283

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murtazashvili J, Murtazashvili I (2015) Anarchy, self-governance, and legal titling. Public Choice 162:287–305

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murtazashvili J, Murtazashvili I (2016a) Can community-based land adjudication and registration improve household land tenure security? Evidence from Afghanistan. Land Use Policy 55:230–239

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murtazashvili J, Murtazashvili I (2016b) When is legal titling and economic answer to political violence? Conference presentation: Informality and Development: A Conference in Honor of Elinor Ostrom at Indiana University

  • Murtazashvili J, Murtazashvili I (2019) The political economy of legal titling. Rev Aust Econ 32:251–268

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pinotti P (2015) The economic costs of organised crime: evidence from southern Italy. The Econ J 125(586):203–232

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Robbins MW, Saunders J, Kilmer B (2017) A framework for synthetic control methods with high-dimensional, micro-level data: evaluating a neighborhood-specific crime intervention. J Am Stat Assoc 112(517):109–126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roncek D, Bell R, Francik J (1981) Housing projects and crime: testing a proximity hypothesis. Soc Probl 29(2):507–548

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rubin M (2011) Perceptions of corruption in the South African housing allocation and delivery programme: what it may mean for accessing the state. J Asian and Afr Stud 46(5):479–490

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rydberg J, McGarrell EF, Norris A, Circo G (2018) A quasi-experimental synthetic control evaluation of a place-based police-directed patrol intervention on violent crime. J Exp Criminol 14:83–109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saunders J, Lundberg R, Braga AA, Ridgeway G, Miles J (2015) A synthetic control approach to evaluating place-based crime interventions. J Quant Criminol 31(3):413–434

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • StatsSA (2018) Victims of Crime Survey. South African Government: Statistics South Africa

  • Williamson C, Kerekes C (2008) Unveiling de Soto’s mystery: property rights, capital, and development. J Inst Econ 4(3):299–325

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson J, Kelling G (1982) Broken windows: the police and neighborhood safety. Atl Mon, 29(38)

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Perry Feldman at the Free Market Foundation for answering my questions and giving me wonderful insight on this project. I would also like to thank Joshua Hall, Bryan McCannon, Alex Lundberg and Todd Nesbitt for their feedback on this project. The author whose name is listed above certifies that they have NO affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest (such as honoraria; educational grants; participation in speakers’ bureaus; membership, employment, consultancies, stock ownership, or other equity interest; expert testimony or patent-licensing arrangements), or non-financial interest (such as personal or professional relationships, affiliations, knowledge or beliefs) in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript. The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Agribusiness Applied Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND, USA

    Kerianne Lawson

Authors
  1. Kerianne Lawson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kerianne Lawson.

Additional information

Publisher’s note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Lawson, K. Using property rights to fight crime: the Khaya Lam project. J Econ Finan 47, 269–302 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12197-023-09621-2

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12197-023-09621-2

Keywords

JEL Classification

Search

Navigation