It’s Not Just Counting that Counts: a Reply to Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen
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Gilbert et al. argue that discussions of self-related changes in patients undergoing DBS are overblown. They show that there is little evidence that these changes occur frequently and make recommendations for further research. We point out that their framing of the issue, their methodology, and their recommendations do not attend to other important questions about these changes.
KeywordsDeep brain stimulation Personal identity Agency Autonomy Self Ethics
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