Abstract
I applaud Fenton and Wiers' attempt to find a demarcation point between cases of addiction that fall within the range of normal function and those that may count as disease. However, I argue that continua don't offer demarcation points, the mechanisms involved are not demonstrably different, and trying to pin down subjectivity doesn't help.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Fenton, Ted, and Reinout W. Wiers. 2017. Free will, black swans and addiction. Neuroethics 10. Neuroethics. doi:10.1007/s12152-016-9290-7.
Lewis, Marc D. 2017. Addiction and the Brain: Development, not Disease. Neuroethics 10. Neuroethics. doi:10.1007/s12152–016–9293-4.
Berridge, Kent C. 2017. Is addiction a brain disease? Neuroethics 10. Neuroethics. doi:10.1007/s12152-016-9286-3.
Flanagan, Owen. 2017. Addiction Doesn’t exist, but it is bad for you. Neuroethics 10. Neuroethics. doi:10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lewis, M. A Continuum is a Continuum, and Swans are Not Geese. Reply to Fenton & Wiers. Neuroethics 10, 167–168 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-017-9319-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-017-9319-6