Abstract
Addicts sometimes engage in such spectacularly self-destructive behavior that they seem to act under compulsion. I briefly review the claim that addiction is not compulsive at all. I then consider recent accounts of addiction by Holton and Schroeder, which characterize addiction in terms of abnormally strong motivations. However, this account can only explain the apparent compulsivity of addiction if we assume—contrary to what we know about addicts—that the desires are so strong as to be irresistible. I then consider accounts that invoke the phenomenon of “ego depletion,” according to which a person can resist temptation for a while, but not indefinitely. Implicit in this account is the assumption that addiction-related desires persist long enough to deplete the addict’s willpower. The balance of the paper argues that the persistence of the desire to consume drugs is a significant form of dysfunction in its own right, and that it makes an important and independent contribution to the compulsivity of addiction. I argue that addiction involves dysfunction in a mechanism that normally prevents a person from being tempted to do something that would invite disaster.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Notes
I prefer “proximal motivation” to “proximal desire,” since the former specifies that the state I have in mind motivates action. The term “desire,” (along with similar terms like “want”) may refer to either a motivation to act or to an agent’s pro-attitude toward a state of affairs. In some contexts—especially where the object of the mental state is a state of affairs rather than the taking of an action, or where less specificity is required—I will use the term “desire.” Thus, I call Smith’s attitude toward the state of affairs in which he sees into the gas tank a desire, but I call his being moved to strike the match a motivation. Thus, in speaking of “proximal motivation” rather than “proximal desire,” I do not mean to draw the distinction between desire and motivation that Schroeder draws.
Of course, some people never form a proximal motivation to consume drugs, even in non-D-type situations. For some people, differences in physiology or experience may attenuate the extent to which a given drug really does improve their hedonic condition. Others are so put off by certain aspects of the use of some or all drugs for moral, religious, or aesthetic reasons that they do not regard them as ways to improve their hedonic condition. Others may believe that drug consumption is likely to have a net negative effect on their hedonic condition. Consequently, many people will not become motivated to consume drugs in response to a desire to improve their hedonic condition. Such people do not create the central puzzle addressed in this paper, namely, why some people do become proximally motivated to consume drugs in non-D-type situations, while others become proximally motivated to consume drugs even in D-type situations.
Numerous findings about cognitive impairments associated with long-term drug use [27] suggest it can impair reasoning capacities involved in identifying danger, predicting consequences, judging likelihoods, and so on, which are central to being able to determine whether one is in D-type situation. Thus, addicts may be less likely than non-addicts to recognize D-type situations when they are in them.
References
Alcoholics Anonymous. 2001. Big Book Online (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., www.aa.org/assets/en_US/en_bigbook_personalstories_partIII.pdf. Accessed 10-9-2014.
West, R. 2006. Theory of addiction. London: Blackwell.
Hari, J. 2005. Chasing the scream: the first and last days of the war on drugs. New York: Bloomsbury.
Pickard, H., and S. Pearce. 2013. Addiction in context: philosophical lessons from a personality disorder clinic. In Addiction and self-control, ed. N. Levy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Foddy, B., and J. Savulescu. 2010. A liberal account of addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17: 1–22.
Heyman, G. 2009. Addiction: a disorder of choice. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2013. Are addicts responsible? In Addiction and self-control, ed. N. Levy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ainslie, G. 2001. Breakdown of will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schroeder, T. 2004. Three faces of desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, T. 2010. Rational action and addiction. In What is addiction, ed. D. Ross, H. Kincaid, D. Spurrett, and P. Collins. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Holton, R. 2009. Willing, wanting, waiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robinson, T., and K. Berridge. 1993. The neural basis of drug craving: an incentive-sensitization theory of addiction. Brain Research Reviews 18: 247–291.
Holton, R., and K. Berridge. 2013. Addiction between compulsion and choice. In Addiction and self-control, ed. N. Levy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, J. 2005. Willing addicts, unwilling addicts, and acting of one’s own free will. Philosophia 33: 237–262.
Dill, B., and R. Holton. 2014. The addict in us all. Frontiers in Psychiatry 5: 1–20.
Levy, N. 2006. Addiction, autonomy, and ego-depletion. Bioethics 20(1): 16–20.
Zaragoza, K. 2006. What happens when someone acts compulsively? Philosophical Studies 131: 251–268.
Baumeister, R., E. Bratslavsky, M. Muraven, and D. Tice. 1998. Ego depletion: is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74: 1252–1265.
Carter, E., L. Kofler, D. Forster, and M. McCullough. 2015. A series of meta-analytic tests of the depletion effect: self-control does not seem to rely on a limited resource. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144: 796–815.
Watson, Gary. 1999. Disordered appetites: addiction, compulsion and dependence. In Addiction: Entries and Exits, ed. Jon Elster. Russell Sage.
Loewenstein, G. 1999. A visceral account of addiction. In Getting hooked: rationality and addiction, ed. J. Elster and O.-J. Skog. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hume, David. 1975. A Treatise of Human Nature. In L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cherniak, C. 1986. Minimal rationality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rachman, S., and P. de Silva. 1978. Abnormal and normal obsessions. Behaviour Research and Therapy 16: 233–248.
Shuster, Simon. 2011. The curse of the crocodile: Russia’s deadly designer drug. Time, Monday.
Achenbach, Joel. 2014. Philip Seymour Hoffman’s death points to broader opioid drug epidemic. Washington Post
Goldstein, Rita, and Nora Volkow. 2011. Dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex in addiction. Nature Reviews—Neurosicence 12.
Levy, N. 2014. Addiction as a disorder of belief. Biology and Philosophy 29: 337–355.
Smith, J., R. Mattick, S. Jamadar, and J. Iredale. 2014. Deficits in behavioural inhibition in substance abuse and addiction: a meta-analysis. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 145: 1–33.
Chiu, Y.-C., and A.R. Aron. 2014. Unconsciously triggered response inhibition requires an executive setting. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General 143: 56–61.
Wertz, J., and M. Sayette. 2001. A review of the effects of perceived drug use opportunity on self-reported urge. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology 9: 3–13.
Papachristou, H., C. Nederkoorn, R. Havermans, M. van der Horst, and A. Jansen. 2012. Can’t stop the craving: the effect of impulsivity on cue-elicited craving for alcohol in heavy and light social drinkers. Psychopharmacology 219: 511–518.
Tabibnia, G., J. Monterosso, K. Baicy, A. Aron, R. Poldrack, S. Chakrapani, B. Lee, and E. London. 2011. Different forms of self-control share a neurocognitive substrate. Journal of Neuroscience 31: 4805–4810.
Smith, D., P. Simon Jones, E. Bullmore, T. Robbins, and K. Ersche. 2014. Enhanced orbitofrontal cortex function and lack of attentional bias to cocaine cues in recreational stimulant users. Biological Psychiatry 75: 124–131.
Skinner, M., M. Coudert, I. Berlin, E. Passeri, L. Michel, and H.-J. Aubin. 2010. Effect of the threat of a disulfiram-ethanol reaction on cue reactivity in alcoholics. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 112: 239–246.
Vanderschuren, L., and S. Ahmed. 2013. Animal studies of addictive behavior. Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Medicine 3: 1–14.
Pelloux, Y., B. Everitt, and A. Dickinson. 2007. Compulsive drug seeking by rats under punishment: effect of drug taking history. Psychopharmacology 194: 127–137.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to several anonymous reviewers and to an audience at the 2013 Northwest Philosophy Conference for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Noggle, R. Addiction, Compulsion, and Persistent Temptation. Neuroethics 9, 213–223 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9279-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9279-2
Keywords
- Addiction
- Compulsion
- Motivation
- Craving