Abstract
Cognitive neuroenhancement (CNE) involves the use of medical interventions to improve normal cognitive functioning such as memory, focus, concentration, or willpower. In this paper I give a Kantian argument defending the use of CNE in science, scholarly research, and creative fields. Kant’s universal law formulation of the categorical imperative shows why enhancement is morally wrong in the familiar contexts of sports or competitive games. This argument, however, does not apply to the use of CNE in higher education, scholarly or scientific research, or creative endeavors such as visual art, fiction or poetry, or musical composition. This is because performance in these areas is embedded within practices that differ in morally significant ways from competitive practices. This important difference provides good reason to think that there is nothing morally wrong with the use of CNE in these areas. My approach is not simply to assume a full-fledged Kantian ethical theory and apply it straight away to the enhancement issue but to establish a reflective equilibrium between our moral intuitions, (Kantian) moral principles that support those intuitions, and the nature of the practices involved.
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Notes
Some scholars have cast doubt on the moral relevance of the therapy/enhancement distinction or on the possibility of even making such a distinction [2–4]. This question is beyond the scope of this paper. Although there may be tricky borderline cases (such as laser eye surgery), I will assume that we can at least sometimes distinguish between the two in obvious cases.
Risks are not limited to unintended side effects of a treatment. There may also be undesirable consequences of the intended effects. For example, too much memory recall might be more of a hindrance than a boon [6].
Craig L. Carr makes a similar point to argue against the unfair advantage argument generally, claiming that it leads to a slippery slope [7]. I, however, am not convinced that we cannot draw principled distinctions between the fair advantages of preparation and the dishonest gains achieved by enhancement.
I follow Rawls (among others) in interpreting CI-1 as a decision procedure [15].
They are not just playing the same kind of game; they are playing in the numerically same token game.
Something like this actually happened in the 1904 Olympic Games in Saint Louis.
Of course sports can and sometimes should change. NBA Basketball did not have a shot clock until the mid-1950s, and no 3-point arc until 1979. A more dramatic change occurred in 1909 when dribbling was allowed. (Before that a player with the ball could only shoot or pass.) Even the rules of chess have been changed. Originally the bishop and queen were much more constrained and pawns could not be promoted. But these kinds of changes are aimed at making the game more interesting, competitive, or challenging.
Thanks to David Fisher for this objection.
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Meyers, C.D. Neuroenhancement in Reflective Equilibrium: A Qualified Kantian Defense of Enhancing in Scholarship and Science. Neuroethics 7, 287–298 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-014-9212-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-014-9212-5