Neuroethics

, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 105–107 | Cite as

Addiction, Compulsion, and Agency

Brief Communication

Abstract

I show that Pickard’s argument against the irresistibility of addiction fails because her proposed dilemma, according to which either drug-seeking does not count as action or addiction is resistible, is flawed; and that is the case whether or not one endorses Pickard’s controversial definition of action. Briefly, we can easily imagine cases in which drug-seeking meets Pickard’s conditions for agency without thereby implying that the addiction was not irresistible, as when the drug addict may take more than one route to go meet her dealer.

Keywords

Addiction Compulsion Agency Freedom Alternative possibilities Causalism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität Duisburg-EssenEssenGermany

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