Notes
The full list of reason codes can be found on the US Treasury Department’s website: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/development-banks/Documents/Voting%20records.pdf
This legislation and the legislation governing the harboring and failure to apprehend war criminals does pertain provisions for the waiving of the sanction but those provisions do not basic human needs.
This was the case for Myanmar from 2004 to 2012, which is the time period under investigation in this study.
Those original regional votes in which all the individual countries that are a part of the proposal could be identified were disaggregated and a separate observation was created for each country. Those original regional observations in which it could not be established which countries were a part of the project were left as one regional observation.
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Braaten, D. “Walking a Tightrope: Human Rights, Basic Human Needs and US Support for Development Projects in the Multilateral Development Banks”. Hum Rights Rev 18, 45–66 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-016-0438-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-016-0438-y