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Treaty Commitment as a Signaling Device: Explaining the Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

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Abstract

This study investigates the determinants of the ratification of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). To do so, it proposes an explanation that postulates that states employ treaty ratification as a device to signal their resolve to implement polices required by the treaty at issue in order to appease demanding domestic constituencies, predicting that states with lower compliance capacity tend to commit faster than states with higher compliance capacity. Applying this explanation to the ICESCR leads to two expectations. First, the larger government spending a proxy of high compliance capacity is hypothesized to delay the ratification process. Second, states with the unitary system are expected to ratify the ICESCR more promptly because the centralized power structure in unitary states significantly restricts the pursuit of the policy autonomy by minorities at local level that the right to self-determination entails. The Cox proportional hazard analysis lends support to both hypotheses.

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Notes

  1. In contrast, Simmons (2009) contends that regionalization/clustering is a result of rational calculation instead of a response to the perceived change in legitimacy criteria.

  2. Thanks for one reviewer suggesting this discussion of previous signaling literature.

  3. Thanks for one reviewer suggesting this discussion of the distinction between two theories.

  4. Donnelly 2007, International Human Rights: Westview Press, however, opposes this dichotomy. He argues that state intervention is indispensable to the protection of any types of rights. Hence, the distinction should more accurately be ascribed to the scope of rights. It is not the intention of this paper to settle this dispute. Nonetheless, scholars often hold the view that the two types of rights do entail differential governmental involvement Cole 2013. “Strong walk and cheap talk: the effect of the international covenant of economic, social, and cultural rights on policies and practices.” Social Forces 92(1):165–94. doi: 10.1093/sf/sot074.

  5. There were nine states that did not ratify the ICESCR by the end of 2010, Belize (accession in 2015), Comoros, Cuba, Haiti, Myanmar, Palau, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa (accession in 2015), and USA.

  6. I thank one reviewer for pointing out this factor.

  7. I thank one reviewer for pointing out this factor.

  8. I thank one reviewer for pointing out the omitted variables.

  9. Please note that a negative sign in the Cox proportional hazard model indicates a lower likelihood of failure and thus longer delay. In the context of this paper, the negative sign of a coefficient means that a variable hinders the ratification of the ICESCR and increases the delay. Symmetrically, a positive sign denotes the opposite.

  10. In survival analysis, hazard ratios capture the effect of a variable at issue on the likelihood of failure. In the context of this paper, hazard ratios indicate that how government spending and unitary system affect the likelihood of ratifying the ICESCR.

  11. I thank one reviewer for suggesting this additional analysis.

  12. I thank one reviewer for suggesting this analysis.

  13. Please go to the Online Appendix for the details.

  14. I thank one reviewer for suggesting these tests. Due to space limitations, the result tables are stored in the Online Appendix.

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Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank David Cingranelli, David Clark, Benjamin Fordham, the Editor, and two reviewers for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are the author’s alone.

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    Zhiyuan Wang

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Wang, Z. Treaty Commitment as a Signaling Device: Explaining the Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Hum Rights Rev 17, 193–220 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-016-0401-y

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