Abstract
This article explores the contribution of the international legal framework to strategies for exercising leverage over and engaging with non-state armed groups. In addressing the framework’s relevance in meeting these challenges, it examines the tensions between hierarchy and reciprocity in international law; key normative developments in international human rights and international humanitarian laws, the issue of existing gaps in the protective framework envisaged by these two bodies of law, and the impact of their growing intersections; recent trends in the international arena that point toward the expansion, as well as restriction, of the normative space and their implications; and, in light of the opportunities/challenges identified, the international legal framework’s prospects for articulating credible engagement strategies with non-state armed groups.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Grant and Keohane (2005).
International Council on Human Rights Policy, Ends & means: human rights approaches to armed groups. Geneva, 2000. According to this study, some of the most common violations attributed to armed groups include torture and ill treatment, arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, arbitrary deprivation of liberty and due process, abuses against children and women, and interference with freedom of movement; see p. 10. In addition, see the UN Secretary-General’s seven reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007, and 2009), as well as the Report of the Expert Meeting on Fundamental Standards of Humanity, Stockholm, 22–24 February 2000 (on file with the author).
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, para. 183.
As in the cases of UNITA (Angola), the different Somali factions, and the KLA (Kosovo); for more on this, see Andreopoulos (2006).
United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/546-S/2003/1053, 10 November 2003, Annex I and Annex II; see also Policzer and Capie (2003).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1882, S/RES/1882, 4 August 2009.
For example, the Code of Conduct for Humanitarian Assistance in Sierra Leone which is annexed to the Inter-Agency Appeal for that country stipulated that “Primary responsibility for the protection and well being of the civilian population and respect for their human rights rests with the Government of the state of authorities in control of the territory in which endangered persons are located. Insurgent groups and militia should be held to the same standard of responsibility as Governments;” United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone (1999), Annex. I, http://www.reliefweb.int/library/appeals/sle99.pdf.
Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law. Report prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva, October 2003.
For example, in a study on Colombia’s armed opposition groups, it was noted that humanitarian actors and analysts have begun to share the view, once confined to government forces, “that armed group violence obeys a purely criminal logic and has lost any political motivation it may once have had.” Among other things, this view has been shaped “by the increasingly serious breaches of humanitarian law committed by these groups…and their confusion or lack of clarity with regard to the political project they are putting forward in peace talks…”; Jaime Prieto Mendez, Armed opposition groups and international humanitarian standards. A comparative look at challenges and strategies. The case of Colombia (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
This does not mean that disengagement is excluded under all circumstances. There are situations in which disengagement may be the only morally, as well as operationally, credible course of action. The United Nations Manual on armed groups has identified five situations in which humanitarian staff should either “approach negotiations more cautiously, or perhaps should not negotiate at all.” These include the likelihood that negotiations could negatively impact humanitarian conditions or jeopardize the security of beneficiaries; when the interaction can put the negotiators of armed groups at risk; when armed groups seek to use the negotiations primarily to support their claims of legitimacy; when armed groups play several humanitarian actors off each other for their own advantage; and when these groups attach conditions that could adversely affect the protection of civilians. United Nations, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (2006). Needless to say, there is considerable overlap among these situations.
I do not include the humanitarian framework given its different emphasis. Although both frameworks are premised on a fundamental commitment to human dignity, the human rights framework focuses primarily on advocacy while the humanitarian primarily on access. To be sure, they have been increasingly intersecting both conceptually and operationally as the whole debate on the need to separate humanitarian negotiation from human rights advocacy indicates; see, for example, Toole (2001). Having said that, and at the risk of overgeneralization, the humanitarian framework is clearly more attuned to the exigencies of contextualization than its human rights counterpart.
I have discussed this at greater length in On the accountability of armed groups, supra note 4; see also Ends & Means, supra note 2.
Expression used by Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics.
This is primarily the position of the structural realists; classical realists like Morgenthau, while acknowledging the importance of anarchy as a cause for state behavior, assign primacy to the will to power (animus dominandi) inherent in every state in the international system. For a recent discussion of the different schools of realism, see Mearsheimer (2001).
Expression used by Nico Krisch, Imperial International Law (draft, on file with the author).
Chayes and Chayes (1995); Slaughter et al. (1998); http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/doc.
Martti Koskenniemi, “The Place of Law in Collective Security,” 17 Michigan Journal of International Law, p. 478.
Krisch, supra note 15.
Part of the reason has to do with the fact that there is a difference between the status of a norm as part of customary international law and its status as a peremptory norm (jus cogens). International law does make a certain allowance for persistent objection (on the part of states) in the process of customary norm formation, but not in the case of peremptory norms. Some of the most commonly cited peremptory norms are the prohibition of genocide, the prohibition of slavery and slave trade, and the prohibition of torture. Concerning the latter, however, post-9/11 developments have launched a debate on the merits of its absolute prohibition. See, among others, the special report on torture “Ends, means and barbarity,” The Economist, January 11th–17th 2003, pp. 18–20; and Levinson (ed.) (2004).
This section draws on my earlier work On the accountability of non-state armed groups supra note 4; and on Andreopoulos (2005).
Report of the Expert Meeting on Fundamental Standards of Humanity, supra note 2. A total of six reports on this initiative have been submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Commission of Human Rights.
A typical example here would be a situation that falls below the threshold envisaged by Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions and is insufficiently covered by the pertinent standards of IHRL (for example, an internal disturbance that does not qualify as a public emergency).
This view reflects the legacy of the horrors of the World War II, which clearly shaped the debates on the drafting of the foundational document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). For more on this, see Morsink (1999).
Meron (2000); http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/docu.
However, what was originally seen as a sign of weakness proved, eventually, to be a source of strength; on this, see Morsink, supra note 24, pp. 19–20.
The emphasis here is on traditionally/primarily because it is by now widely recognized that IHRL applies in situations of armed conflict. As the International Court of Justice stated in its Nuclear Weapons case (advisory opinion) “The protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency;” International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.
A controversial and rather ill-defined concept that encompasses, among other things, the incidental loss of civilian life in the context of lawful military operations. Concerning IHRL, in the case of the death penalty, there is a consensus in the human rights community on the need to work toward its eventual abolition; the other issue, however, is the loss of life in the context of law enforcement operations to apprehend suspects or to quell disturbances that fall below the threshold of applicability of IHL. On IHL, and in particular on the issue of the loss of civilian life, see, for example, the precautionary measures provisions of article 57 of Additional Protocol I (1977). The issue of the threshold of applicability is addressed in common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as in Additional Protocol II (1977). According to article 1(2) of the Protocol, “situations of internal disturbances and tensions” are excluded, “as not being armed conflicts.”
Report of the Expert Meeting on Fundamental Standards of Humanity, supra note 2. There has been a plethora of terms to describe internal conflict situations. The Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols refer to non-international armed conflicts. Due to disagreements over thresholds of applicability for humanitarian norms, the Secretary-General has used the term internal violence to “describe situations where fighting and conflict, of whatever intensity, is taking place inside countries;” Commission on Human Rights. Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Minimum Humanitarian Standards. Analytical Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/21,E/CN.4/1998/87, 5 January 1998.
Ibid; and Eide et al. (1995).
The Convention provides in article IV for the punishment of persons committing genocide “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals.”
See, for example, the preambular references in the UDHR to the fact that “every individual…shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms…,” as well as in article 29 to everyone’s “duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.”
“…genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law…”: article I of the Genocide Convention.
On the latter, see Meron (1998).
Minimum Humanitarian Standards, supra note 29. One example relates to the right to life. While human rights instruments are more specific when it comes to the circumstances under which the application of the death penalty might constitute a violation of the right to life, they are not helpful when it comes to the circumstances under which “certain means or methods of combat” in situations of internal violence “might violate the right to life.” This should be contrasted to the more detailed provisions of IHL instruments concerning the illegality of “certain means and methods of warfare,” thus shielding the civilian population from the effects of hostilities; ibid.
See, for example, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, A/RES/53/144, 8March 1999. Article 10 stipulates, “No one shall participate, by act or failure to act where required, in violating human rights and fundamental freedoms….”
This is a separate argument from the one that points to state responsibility for violations perpetrated by non-state actors. To be sure, the state bears responsibility under international law for human rights violations committed by private persons in its territory, and in particular for failure to exercise “due diligence” to prevent the violations in question or to respond to them as required by law, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in Velasquez Rodrigues v. Honduras. However, this argument is premised on the state’s ability to enforce its obligations. In many situations involving armed groups, the state in question has either disintegrated or been severely weakened; hence, it lacks capacities of enforcement.
Some of the concerns associated with public emergencies have been addressed in General Comment 29 issued by the Human Rights Committee.
For similar arguments relating to the applicability of IHRL, see note 37.
This was one of the concerns expressed by the Government of Canada in its comments on the Minimum Humanitarian Standards Report prepared by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; United Nations Economic and Social Council, Minimum Humanitarian Standards. Analytical Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/21. Views and information received from States and United Nations bodies. Addendum, E/CN.4/1998/87/Add.1, 12 January 1998. See also supra, note 29.
For example, obligations pertaining to the protection and care of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked (article 7), or to due process (article 6).
See below the discussion on the Rome Statute.
See Koskenniemi, supra note 17.
Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian issues and agencies as triggers for international military action,” International Review of the Red Cross, no. 839, pp. 673–698; see also UNSC Resolution 1296 (2000), which states that the deliberate targeting of civilian populations may constitute a threat to international peace and security, paving thus the way for possible UN-authorized action.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992; United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, New York, DPI/1321/Rev. 3, June 1994, p. 41.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 864, 15 September 1993; United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation in Angola. New York, DPI/1552/PKO/Rev. 1, February 1995, pp. 43 and 45.
Ibid, p. 44.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, supra note 46.
Here, I refer primarily to domestic courts operating on the basis of the principle of universal jurisdiction to hybrid/internationalized tribunals (like Sierra Leone and Cambodia) and to the growing use of truth and reconciliation commissions.
The best example is Henry Kissinger (2001) who, in his discussion of universal jurisdiction, states that this “unprecedented concept…has spread with extraordinary speed….The danger is that it is being pushed to extremes which risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of governments.
Van Schaack (1999).
Prosecutor v. Tadic, (IT-94-1), Appeals Chamber. Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para.141, http://www.un.org/icty.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, (IT-94-1), Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 654, ibid.
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hajim Delic, and Esad Landzo (Celebici Case), (IT-96-21-A), Appeals Chamber Judgment, 20 February 2001, para.106, http://www.un.org/icty.
Appeals Judgment, para. 81.
Ibid, quoted in para. 96; see also remarks by Meron, supra note 25.
Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, (IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002.
Ibid, para. 146.
Ibid, para. 147.
Ibid, para. 148.
See article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.
However, in this context, there is no requirement for the organized groups in question to be under responsible command nor to exercise control over the territory, which generates a certain confusion concerning the relevant benchmarks of organizational capacity.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593, 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593 (2005).
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General. Geneva, 25 January 2005; http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/Report_to_UN_on_Darfur.pdf.
Ibid.
International Criminal Court. Office of the Prosecutor. Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005). Hague, 14 June 2006; http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/OTP_ReportUNSC_3-Darfur_English.pdf.
As Claude (1984) notes in his discussion of the objective requirements of collective security, the system can sustain the trust of member states “only if it succeeds in reducing, rather than increasing, their exposure to the perils of military involvement.
When contrasted, for example, to the General Assembly that privileges reciprocity.
I would also include here the responsibility to protect (R2P), arguably the successor concept to humanitarian intervention.
In this context, reducing UNSC authorization to a purely formal level signifies its transformation from a source of legal authority to that of one of many policy justifications for a particular course of action; on this, see Chesterman, supra note 42, p. 218.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to deal with the legality of NATO’s operation against the FRY in the Spring of 1999. For a discussion of the pertinent issues, see the debate in the Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention (1999), http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm; and Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), especially chapter 6, “International Law and Humanitarian Intervention,” pp. 163–198.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160, S/RES/1160 (1998), 31 March 1998. It is instructive to remember the statement by Robert Gelbard, US Special Envoy to the Balkans, issued more than a year before the NATO action, that the KLA “is without any question a terrorist group;” Hedges (1999).
This quote is from the Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, We the Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, http://www.un.org/millenium/sg/report/full.htm. During the 1999 General Assembly debate, several delegations expressed concern over the implications of the Kosovo intervention. Among them, the Permanent Representative of India warned against “…a rising interventionist impulse, using humanitarian concerns as a trigger or pretext…the call for intervention is also being heard when some regressive elements are espousing ideologies supporting enforced homogenization or separation of ethnic groups…” Statement by Mr. Kamalesh Sharma, PR on October 6, 1999, http://www.un.int/india/ind40.htm.
The UN Secretary-General refers to this problem when, in his third report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, he cites, as one of the reasons for the difficulties in securing humanitarian access in conflict situations, the unwillingness of states “to engage non-State actors in dialogue, either on the peace process or on their obligations to civilian populations under the Geneva Conventions;” S/2002/1300, 26 November 2002, p. 6.
See also my discussion in “The Impact of the War on Terror on the Accountability of Armed Groups,” supra note 20, pp. 177–179.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002, p. 5.
Ibid, pp. 6, 10, 11 and 16.
As provided in 1949 Geneva Convention III, article 4 para. A (2).
See de Torrente (2002).
The White House has claimed that although the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees as opposed to the Al-Qaida detainees, “neither the Taliban nor al-Qaida detainees are entitled to POW status;” The White House. Fact Sheet. Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, February 7, 2002.
Ibid.
See discussion below on the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et.al. case.
The USA has signed and ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Convention III stipulates that captured individuals “shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” In addition, the US Army Manual states: “When doubt exists as to whether captured enemy personnel warrant PW status, Art. 5 Tribunals must be convened;” US Army, Operational Law Handbook, JA 422 (1997).
See also the remarks by Nicolas de Torrente, supra note 82, p. 7.
Last Spring, the Obama administration indicated its preference for avoiding the designation of the anti-terrorist campaign as a ‘global war on terror’ (GWOT), opting instead for “overseas contingency operations;” Burkeman (2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/25/obama-war-terror-over…; Concerning Guantanamo, enemy combatants and the standard for the government’s authority to detain terrorist suspects, see Congressional Research Service (2009).
As of January 1, 2009, the U.S. State Department reports 102 Bilateral Immunity Agreements. Out of these, 50 have been signed by countries parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC.
United Nations. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. United Nations Department of Public Information, 2004, p. 64.
ICRC denounces Guantanamo detentions, Washington defends “humane treatment,” October 11, 2003, wysiwyg://18/http://sg.news.yahoo.com/031010/1/3ev9i.html; and Greenhouse (2003).
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), Rule 90, Vol. I, pp. 315–319.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), Rule 93, pp. 323–327.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), Rule 100, pp. 352–371.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), Rule 104, pp. 375–379.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), Rule 53, pp. 186–189.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), Rule 54, pp. 189–193.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), Rule 55, pp. 193–200.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), Rule 56, pp. 200–202.
For the density of intersections, see the discussion of these rules in the ICRC study.
George Andreopoulos, Comments on an early draft of the Manual on Humanitarian Negotiations submitted to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (on file with the author).
Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups, supra note 10.
United Nations, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (2006), p. 36; see more generally, pp. 30–40.
United Nations, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (2006), pp. 47–50.
On Geneva Call’s most recent activities, see Geneva Call, Annual Report, 2008. According to the latest information, 39 non-state armed groups in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East have signed the Deed of Commitment; http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm (accessed November 9, 2009). The most recent report of the UNSG on the protection of civilians in armed conflict has characterized Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment as a successful example of an engagement initiative with armed groups; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. S/2009/277, 29 May 2009.
“Humanitarian negotiators should be careful not to use, or be seen to use, the International Criminal Court as a threat to armed groups to advance humanitarian negotiations;” Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups, supra note 10, p. 36. While from a negotiating perspective this makes sense since there are serious security-related issues involved here, the Manual states that the Statute and the ICC “can have a powerful deterrent effect on members of an armed group” (ibid). It is not clear on what basis the Manual makes this assertion (which is indeed questionable); but since it does, it would have been interesting to see what (if any) contribution it could have made to the negotiating process.
See Meron, supra note 25.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
According to article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), no procedural rule for any military tribunal may be “contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ; in addition, these rules must be “uniform as far as practicable.” See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, ibid.
Ibid.
The ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case which stated that article 3 “serves as a ‘minimum yardstick of protection in all conflicts,’” and the ICTY decision in the Tadic case which noted that, in deciding whether article 3 applies, “the character of the conflict is irrelevant;” ibid, p. 68.
Commentaries to Geneva Convention III (prisoners of war) and Geneva Convention IV (civilians).
Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I, supra note 92.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 108.
See especially the discussion of rules 100 and 101 in Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 92, pp. 352–372.
Common article 3 and article 75 of Additional Protocol I constitute prime examples of the growing intersections between international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
See previous discussion on common article 3. Article 75 is largely drawn from article 14 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The ICRC study, while acknowledging that the practice of armed opposition groups “may contain evidence of the acceptance of certain rules in non-international armed conflicts,” notes that “its legal significance is unclear;” Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I, supra note 92, p. xxxvi. This, however, strengthens the argument for a non-legally binding document.
See also the concluding summary of the Report of the Expert Meeting on Fundamental Standards of Humanity, supra note 2; in addition, my piece On the accountability of non-state armed groups, supra note 4.
In this context, see also Scheinin (2005).
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html The African Union, recently adopted a Convention on IDPs which stipulates, among other things, that States Parties shall “ensure the accountability of non-State actors concerned,…for acts of arbitrary displacement or complicity in such acts;” and for “the accountability of non-State actors involved in the exploration and exploitation of economic and natural resources leading to displacement.” Both of these provisions are applicable to armed groups; African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (adopted on October 22, 2009).
See also my piece on “The Impact of the War on Terror on the Accountability of Armed Groups,” supra note 20, pp. 180–182.
See also Ends&Means, supra note 2.
On special agreements, see also Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law. Report prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva, October 2003.
For the proposal on Security Council involvement, see report on International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (workshop 1), 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 2 to 6 December 2003, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList189/4.
For example, in 1998, the Commission adopted a resolution condemning the Lord Resistance Army’s abusive conduct towards children in Northern Uganda; see Mawson (1999).
Among the thematic mandates assumed by the Human Rights Council, the work of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women is of particular relevance here. The Rapporteur has drawn attention to the responsibility of armed groups in connection with the commission of acts of sexual violence in conflict situations. The issue of sexual violence has recently received much attention in the UN system, and in particular in the UNSC with the adoption of UNSC resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 1889 (2009).
On the potential role of these organs, see George Andreopoulos, “Implementing Standards: Strategies and Mechanisms for Engaging Armed Groups,” presentation at the APSA Convention, Chicago, September 2–5, 2004.
References
George Andreopoulos, "Human Rights/Humanitarian Law Violations and Threats to International Peace and Security,” in Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent (eds.), From A Culture of Impunity to a Culture of Accountability (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004)
George Andreopoulos, “The Impact of the War on Terror on the Accountability of Armed Groups,” in Howard Hensel (ed.), The Law of Armed Conflict. Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Military Force (Derbyshire: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 172–174
George Andreopoulos, “On the accountability of non-state armed groups,” in George Andreopoulos, Zehra Arat and Peter Juviler (eds.), Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 2006)
Bruce Broomhall, International Justice & the International Criminal Court. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003)
Oliver Burkeman, “Obama administration says goodbye to ‘war on terror,” The Guardian, 25 March 2009
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995)
Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 112–162
Inis Claude. Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization (Fourth Edition). (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), p. 258
Bill Clinton, “A Just and Necessary War,” The New York Times, May 23, 1999
Congressional Research Service, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, September 15, 2009
Nicolas de Torrente, “Challenges to Humanitarian Action,” Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 16(2), 2002, p. 5
Michael Doyle and Stephen Holmes, “Arm the K.L.A.,” The New York Times, May 25, 1999
Asbjorn Eide, Allan Rosas and Theodor Meron, “Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts through Minimum Humanitarian Standards,” 89 AJIL (1995), pp. 215–223
Richard Falk in “Assessing the Pinochet Litigation: Whither Universal Jurisdiction?” in Stephen Macedo (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction. National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), p. 100
Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,” American Political Science Review, vol. 99 (1), 2005, p. 29
Linda Greenhouse, “Post-9/11 Detainee Cases on Supreme Court Docket,” The New York Times, November 3, 2003, p. A 16
Chris Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?” Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, p. 36
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law. Vol. I: Rules and Vol II: Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report. Conflict. International Response. Lessons Learned. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)
Henry Kissinger. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 273
Sanford Levinson (ed.), Torture. A Collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
Andrew Mawson, Peace at Any Price? A Discussion of Efforts to Influence the Lord’s Resistance Army of Northern Uganda. The International Council on Human Rights Policy, August 1999, p. 44
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (Norton, 2001), especially pp. 1–54
Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age. Essays. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), pp. 231–232
Theodor Meron, “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law,” 94AJIL (2000)
Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Origins, Drafting and Intent. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 36–91
NATO’s Kosovo Intervention,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 93(4), October 1999
Pablo Policzer and David Capie, Curbing Human Rights Violations by Non-State Armed Groups. Summary Report of a Conference held by the Armed Groups Project at the University of British Columbia, November 14–15, 2003
Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 218, 241, 298, 354, 423, and 484
Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against Humanity. The Struggle for Global Justice. (New York: New Press, 2000)
William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
Martin Scheinin, Turku/Abo Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards. International Council on Human Rights Policy & International Commission of Jurists Workshop, Standard-setting: Lessons Learned for the Future. Geneva, 13–14 February 2005
J.B. Scott (ed.), The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, 3rd ed.(New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), pp. 101–102
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,” 92AJIL (July 1998)
Daniel Toole, Humanitarian Negotiation: Observations from Recent Experience. Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 22 February 2001
United Nations, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups. A Manual for Practitioners. United Nations, January 2006, pp. 12–14
US Army, Operational Law Handbook, JA 422, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s School, US Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1997, p. 18–8
Beth Van Schaack, “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity. Resolving the Incoherence,” 37(3) Colum. J. Transnat’L L. (1999), pp. 787–850
David Wippman, “Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice,” 23 Fordham International Law Journal (1999)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This article is based on a paper originally prepared for a conference on “Curbing Human Rights Violations by Non-State Armed Groups,” University of British Columbia, November 13–15, 2003. Portions of this article are drawn from “Implementing Standards: Strategies and Mechanisms for Engaging Armed Groups,” presentation at the American Political Science Association Convention, Chicago, September 2–5, 2004.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Andreopoulos, G.J. The International Legal Framework and Armed Groups. Hum Rights Rev 11, 223–246 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0151-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0151-1