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East Asia

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 133–148 | Cite as

Pivoting to Indo-Pacific? The Limits of Indian and Indonesian Integration

  • Priya ChackoEmail author
  • David Willis
Article

Abstract

Proponents of the Indo-Pacific concept assume that growing economic and societal linkages and the need for greater political and security cooperation and order-building are leading to the integration of the region. India and Indonesia were thought to be crucial in these processes of regionalisation and regionalism and were early adopters of the Indo-Pacific idea. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which the Indo-Pacific initiatives of India and Indonesia are leading to the integration of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions through greater Indian involvement with the Pacific region and stronger Indonesian engagement with the Indian Ocean region. It is argued that an interlinked set of security and economic concerns drove India and Indonesia’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific idea. In both cases, a desire for economic growth and preventing Chinese economic and political dominance in the region were important drivers. However, the nature of the political economies of India and Indonesia does not readily facilitate extensive economic linkages or strategic interests beyond their immediate regions. Moreover, both countries are wary of being seen as members of anti-China coalitions due to the impact this may have on regional stability and their domestic political and economic priorities. These factors place significant limitations on the regional integration of the Indo-Pacific.

Keywords

Indo-Pacific India Indian Ocean region Indonesia Pacific region Political economy Regionalism Regionalisation Security 

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of AdelaideAdelaideAustralia
  2. 2.Flinders UniversityAdelaideAustralia

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