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Bribery with Chinese Characteristics? Corruption, Fuzzy Property Rights, and Rapid Growth

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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of whether the way bribery is practiced in China is such that corruption might be compatible with rapid economic growth during the boom years between 2000 and 2007. In particular, it examines whether bribery based on diffuse reciprocity transforms a corrupt relationship from one based on short-term egoistic gains (looting) to one based on long-term gains (profit maximizing), with the assumption that such a form of bribery will lead the parties to maximize total gains and hence will encourage long-term growth rather than short-term predatory looting. More broadly, the paper inquires whether a regime of informal property rights based on bribery and diffuse reciprocity might compensate for the shortcomings of an imperfectly constructed and incomplete set of formal property rights such as has emerged in post-Mao China and thereby improve the prospects for economic growth. The paper concludes that while bribery based on diffuse reciprocity may encourage the parties directly involved in such corrupt exchanges to maximize their total long-term gains, so long as bribery remains a private good and an informal property rights regime based on bribery remains subject to abrupt and catastrophic revision due to its illegal nature, “bribery with Chinese characteristics” cannot be characterized as growth enhancing and thus cannot be a major explanation for why the Chinese economy grew rapidly during the “third boom.”

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Notes

  1. According to the International Monetary Fund’s “World Economic Outlook,” the Chinese economy grew at an average rate of nearly 10% between 1980 and 2014, and as a result, per capita Gross Domestic Product increased over 16-fold. International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook October 2014,’ available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx.

  2. “The Property Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China,” adopted and promulgated March 16, 2007, effective on October 1, 2007, available at http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/general/property-rights-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html. On the perceived strengthening of China property rights, see World Economic Forum, “Global Competitiveness Index,” available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/downloads/.

  3. In Olson’s construct, insecure, unstable, and unpredictable property rights put businesses in a situation analogous to that of peasant farmers in Dark Ages Europe who faced a Hobbesian choice between having their farms ravaged by “roving bandits” who would plunder their crops, burn their hovels, and carry off their wives and children, leaving them (if they were not put to the sword) to starve and freeze to death, or paying “stationary bandits” such extortionary protection money that they were left cold and hungry. [Mancur Olson [7]. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review, 87 (3), 567–576].

  4. Growth in per capita GDP based on data from the World Bank, “World Development Indicators.” In its 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International’s “poll of polls” gave the USA a score of 2.24 on a scale of 0 (less corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt) and gave China a score of 6.50, putting the USA on the lower quartile boundary of TI’s index and China on the upper quartile boundary. Based on data from Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index” 1995–2016, available at http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.

  5. If we define an economic “boom” as a period in which the Chinese economy grew at 10% of more, the first boom was between 1983 and 1988, the second was from 1992 to 1996, and the third was from 2003 to 2007.

  6. South China Morning Post, 6/7/1997.

  7. Impressive as the sums of corrupt monies of the current pack of tigers might seem, many believe that they actually represent only a fraction of the actual amounts these officials were illegally salting away. According to Reuters, for example, investigators seized Y90 billion (US$14.5 billion) in cash, goods, and property when they took down former Politburo member and head of the powerful Central Committee Politics and Law Committee Zhou Yongkang, his extended family, and his circle of cronies. Zhou was, however, ultimately convicted of accepting just Y130 million (US$21.3 million). Even with the additional Y129 million in dirty assets were seized from Zhou’s wife Jia Xiaoye and his son Zhou Bin factored in, the total prosecutors publically linked to Zhou was a tiny fraction of his allegedly loot. Reuters, 3/30/2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/30/us-china-corruption-zhou-idUSBREA2T02S20140330 and Xinhua, 6/11/2015, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/11/c_134318642.htm.

  8. Data from author’s database. In total, my database identifies 50 officials holding ranks at or above a level equivalent to that of Vice Minister as having been charged with corruption between 2000 and 2007, including Politburo member Chen Liangyu who came under investigation in 2006.

  9. Data from author’s database.

  10. Because the typical hongbao can hold about Y10,000, as the size of bribes has grown over the years, favor-seekers have had to find other ways to “package” their cash gifts to officials. Large cash “gifts” can become quite bulky since the large denomination bill is currently the 100 kuai note. It would, therefore, require multiple suitcases or boxes to deliver sizable cash bribes. Storing large caches of dirty cash can also become a problem if a corrupt official cannot figure out how to slip his or her monies out of China or launder them into real property or sneak them into the banking system using false name accounts. Gift cards can, however, be loaded up with Y1,000 a piece, thus making it easier to pass a bribe of Y50,000 than it would be to hand over five hongbao. Gift cards are also easier to hide and not likely to become moldy or rot if stored in a damp closet or buried in the backyard. Bloomberg, 2/12/2015, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-12/china-gift-cards-are-casualty-of-anticorruption-drive.

  11. China Daily, 9/2/2014.

  12. In 2008, the son of Su Shunhu, a senior official in the Ministry of Railways who controlled the allocation of freight cars, reportedly received ten hongbao each containing Y10,000 from a single guest at his wedding. Another guest reportedly handed over a single hongbao with US$10,000. After the son, Su Guanlin, and his bride Qian Yi moved to Australia, businesses seeking to get his father to allocate them space on China’s overtaxed rail freight system wired the couple a total of Y6.5 million between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2010, which they used to make a series of real estate investments. At the time, shippers were reportedly willing to pay bribes of Y100,000 per freight carriage to get their goods moved. Another trading company reportedly paid Su Guanlin over Y10 million in “salary” for a job which he never actually worked. Su Shanhu was arrested in 2011 and charged with accepting Y25 million in bribes. He was convicted in 2014 and sentenced to life in prison. Australian Financial Review, 10/25/2014, available at http://www.afr.com/p/national/how_chinese_fortunes_are_hidden_EQ7mBdl8pJh7Hy3q9aw6qO. In 2013, the Deputy Director of the Hunan Justice Bureau reportedly collected Y1 million in hangbao money from guests to his son’s wedding, which involved a thirty-table banquet at a five-star hotel that cost Y85,000. Xinhua, 1/6/2013.

  13. The “rules” of a guanxi-based bribery relationship by Chinese officials essentially mirror the “rules” laid down by former Providence Mayor Buddy Cianci, who said he followed three rules: first never take money in the office, second never do a favor directly for money, and third never discuss money and favors together. In 2001, Cianci was indicted on 27 federal charges. He beat 26 of them but was convicted on federal racketeering charges and sentenced to 4 years. [Mike Stanton [22]. The Prince of Providence: The True Story of Buddy Cianci, America’s Most Notorious Mayor, Some Wiseguys, and the Feds, New York: Random House].

  14. China Daily, 8/6/2014.

  15. The Calgary Herald, 3/23/2007; SCMP, 6/10/2013.

  16. Forbes, 11/17/2017, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/11/17/jpmorgan-agrees-to-pay-264-million-fine-for-sons-and-daughters-hiring-program-in-china/#78d9d9125688.

  17. NYT, 8/29/2013; China Everbright Bank web page, available at http://www.cebbank.com/Channel/63639272; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Blog, 2/13/2014, available at http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/2/12/ubs-suspends-two-bankers-in-china-hiring-probe.html; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/3/26/top-jpmorgan-china-banker-leaving-amid-hiring-probe.html; http://english.caixin.com/2014-05-22/100681090.html; http://www.ntd.tv/en/programs/news-politics/china-forbidden-news/20140526/148959-jp-morgans-case-publicly-reported-in-china-is-zeng-qinghong-now-in-trouble.html.

  18. Radio Free Asia, 10/5/2013, available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/wealth-11152013105758.html.

  19. After his parents were sent to prison and had their property confiscated, Guagua, who had elected to remain in the USA after he graduated from Harvard, still apparently had the financial wherewithal to enroll in Columbia Law Schools. According to Columbia Law School’s admissions webpage, the estimated cost of a year of law school is currently close to US$86,000. http://web.law.columbia.edu/admissions/graduate-legal-studies/tuition-fees-and-financial-aid, access 10/26/2014. The estimated cost for an international student at the Kennedy School was US$73,000. See http://www.hks.harvard.edu/degrees/sfs/prospective-students/tuition/intl. Bo Guagua’s living expense may have been considerable higher as it was reported that he lived in a US$3500 a month apartment in Cambridge.

  20. New York Times, 4/16/2012. Bo Guagua told the Harvard Crimson that his school costs, which Asahi Shimbun estimated at about US$500,000, were covered by scholarships and money his mother had earned while working as a lawyer in the 1990s. Asahi Shimbun, 10/3/2012.

  21. China Daily, 8/28/2013 and SCMP, 9/9/2013. According to AFP, Xu paid for a charter jet to take Bo Guagua to Tanzania in 2011 and paid for a trip to the World Cup in Germany in 2006. Agence France Press, 8/23/2013.

  22. The Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2013, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323420604578650071253073626.

  23. Xu reported cultivated a number of other senior officials. According to the New York Times, he invested in a number of private ventures with members of Wen Jiabao’s family and may have even dated Wen’s daughter Wen Ruchun. He befriended Wen’s wife Zhang Beili and Wen’s son Wen Yunsong by investing in a number of gem trading companies controlled by Zhang Beili or other of Wen’s relatives. NYT, 8/31/2013.

  24. A “tough cop” who made his reputation fighting organized crime in Liaoning, Wang Lijun was a central figure in the fall of Bo Xilai. Bo had Wang transferred from Liaoning where he had built a reputation as a tough cop to Chongqing after Bo was appointed party secretary of the city in 2008. Once in Chongqing, Wang spearheaded a highly publicized crackdown on organized crime. In retrospect, however, it appears that the crackdown was actually a disguise for a takeover of the city’s lucrative underworld from the local gangs and squeezing prominent developers, many of whom were arrested on corruption charges and had their assets seized. Bo and Wang fell out after Wang confronted Bo with evidence that Gu Kailai had murdered an English businessman, Neil Heywood, in a dispute over money. After clashing with Bo, Wang fled to Chengdu in neighboring Sichuan in an apparent attempt to gain political asylum at the US consulate. After the Americans refused to grant him asylum and police from Chongqing surrounded the consulate, Wang managed to arrange for officials from the Ministry of State Security to fly to Chengdu and escort him back to Beijing. Wang was subsequently charged with treason and corruption. He was convicted and sent to prison for 15 years. Gu received a suspended death sentenced after being convicted of murdering Heywood and accepting bribes from Xu Ming. Radio Free Asia (RFA), 2/13/2012 and 9/24/2012 and Reuters, 8/20/2012 [24].

  25. South China Morning Post (SCMP), 8/27/2013.

  26. The Wall Street Journal, 9/22/2013.

  27. Liu Han was arrested in May 2013 on murder and organized crime charges. He and his brother were said to have built an extensive criminal syndicate based in Sichuan and carried out a series of hits on rival gangsters. Liu was sentenced to death in August 2014. Liu’s relationship with Zhou Bin was not part of the charges against him. Want China Times, 5/14/2013; China Daily, 5/19/2014; Global Times, 8/8/2014; and The Washington Post, 5/23/2014.

  28. Career data from China Vitae http://chinavitae.com/biography/Zhou_Yongkang/career.

  29. According to Reuters, when they moved against Zhou, investigators froze Y37 billion in bank deposits, seized stocks and bonds worth Y51 billion, “confiscated about 300 apartments and villas worth around Y1.7 billion,” and seized art worth Y1 billion. Not all of these assets necessarily belong to Zhou Yongkang or even his extended family (his brother, sisters-in-law, and a nephew were detained along with Zhou, Zhou’s wife Jia Xiaoye, his sister-in-law Jia Xiaoxia, Zhou Bin, and Zhou Bin’s wife Huang Wan). In July 2016, Zhou Bin was sentenced to 18 years after being convicted of accepting Y98 million in bribes and obtaining Y124 million from illegal deals. Jia Xiaoye was also convicted in July 2016 and sentenced to 9 years. Zhou Bin’s mother-in-law escaped arrest because she had immigrated to Southern California. Reuters, 3/30/2014; SCMP, 6/15/2016; SCMP, 6/16/2016; and China Daily, 6/16/2016.

  30. SCMP, 10/21/2014.

  31. Straits Times, 8/23/2014 and Reuters, 4/25/2012.

  32. Caixin, 4/9/2012.

  33. Reuters, 4/25/2012.

  34. Ibid.

  35. Hurun, “Richest People in China,” available at http://www.hurun.net/en/ and AFP, 8/23/2013.

  36. China Daily, 8/28/2013 and SCMP, 9/9/2013.

  37. Global Times, 8/20/2013; SCMP, 8/16/2013; http://www.jcrb.com/anticorruption/ffyw/201309/t20130925_1210283.html; China Daily, 9/25/2013; Shanghai Daily, 9/25/2013; http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/813722.shtml#.UwtY6J0o7IW; http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/851237.shtml#.UzSVoJ3D_IU; http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/shfzb/html/2014-03/28/content_30524.htm; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/4/25/china-corruption-blotter-april-25-2014.html; http://www.chinanews.com/fz/2014/08-06/6464851.shtml; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/8/29/china-corruption-blotter-august-29-2014.html; http://english.caixin.com/2014-09-08/100726114.html; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/9/11/huawei-confronts-its-biggest-challenge-internal-graft.html; SCMP, 9/10/2014; http://news.jcrb.com/jxsw/201204/t20120410_840135.html; http://news.jcrb.com/jxsw/201204/t20120412_842216.html; China Daily, 7/31/2012; Caixin, 7/31/2012; Caixin, 7/27/2012; China Daily, 9/21/2012; Shanghai Daily, 9/20/2012; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/10/8/china-corruption-blotter-october-8-2012.html; http://www.chinanews.com/fz/2012/09-20/4197153.shtml; Shanghai Daily, 10/9/2012; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/10/18/china-corruption-blotter-october-18-2012.html; http://news.cqnews.net/html/2012-10/09/content_20384886.htm; and China Daily, 12/18/2013.

  38. GlaxoSmithKline was accused of paying Y3 billion in kickbacks and ultimately fired over a hundred of its sales representatives. The head of its China operations, Mark Reilly, was convicted of allowing his subordinates to pay kickbacks and sentenced to three years. Reilly’s sentence was quickly suspended and he was deported. Two others, Peter Humphreys and his wife Yu Yingzeng, who GlaxoSmithKline hired to investigate the source of e-mails about the kickbacks, were charged with violating state secrecy laws and sentenced to 2.5 years. Several of the company’s Chinese executives were also arrested. China Daily, 7/16/2013; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/4/17/gsk-cuts-150-china-staff-for-improper-sales-practices.html; http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/us-china-glaxosmithkline-idUSBREA4D03720140514; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28083796; http://www.ibtimes.com/mark-reilly-glaxosmithkline-bribery-investigation-complicated-new-sex-tape-scandal-1615394; http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/30/glaxosmithkline-pharmaceuticals-industry; SCMP, 7/1/2014; http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/business/international/glaxosmithkline-china.html?_r=0; http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-gsk-china-idUSKBN0F40YN20140630; SCMP, 9/20/2014; http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/19/us-gsk-china-idUSKBN0HE0TC20140919?utm_source=The+Sinocism+China+Newsletter&utm_campaign=979ce85d5f-Sinocism09_19_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_171f237867-979ce85d5f-29600033&mc_cid=979ce85d5f&mc_eid=c0b48b4b5d; and http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/us-china-glaxosmithkline-idUSBREA4D03720140514; and SCMP, 9/20/2014.

  39. CNNMoney, 7/24/2013; http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2014/0427/c64371-24947729.html; http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2014-06/21/content_99438.htm; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/8/1/china-corruption-blotter-august-1-2014.html; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/24/china-corruption-blotter-august-24-2012.html; http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/locality/content/2012-06/26/content_3672165.htm?node=37232; http://news.hc3i.cn/art/201207/20254.htm; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/7/24/china-corruption-blotter-july-24-2012.html; http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/1/4/china-corruption-blotter-january-4-2013.html; and http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-12/sino-biopharm-plunges-after-cctv-bribery-report-hong-kong-mover.html.

  40. Global Times, 10/15/2013 and Reuters, 4/4/2014.

  41. China Compliance Digest, 1/27/2014.

  42. Shanghai Daily, 7/28/2013 and AFP, 7/27/2013.

  43. “Training” was frequently conducted in places such as Hawaii, Los Vegas, and other resort destinations, with the “trainees” spending little or none of their time in the classroom.

  44. http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/ajcc/201309/t20130914_10161.html.

  45. Jingji Cankao Bao, 11/3/2014, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20141103/021420711617.shtml.

  46. Low- and middle-level Chinese officials face mandatory retirement in their fifties, and because pensions are often small, there is a need for post-retirement income.

  47. The following paragraphs draw heavily on Caixin, 10/24/2014, available at http://english.caixin.com/2014-10-24/100743023.html; China Daily, 8/25/2014; Global Times, 8/25/2014, Caixin, 8/25/2014; http://english.caixin.com/2014-08-25/100720958.html; SCMP, 8/24/2014; http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/ajcc/201408/t20140823_26678.html; Caixin, 9/5/2014; and SCMP, 10/23/2014.

  48. http://english.caixin.com/2014-08-25/100720958.html.

  49. Ling Jihua, who had been Director of the Central Committee’s General Office from 2007 to 2012 and was considered to have been General Secretary Hu Jintao’s right-hand man, fell from grace after his son Ling Gu was killed when he plowed a US$200,000 Ferrari Spider into a Beijing bridge abutment in the early hours of March 18, 2012. Ling, who had been rumored to be candidate for a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, was sidelined at the 18th Party Congress and later arrested. Ling was given a life sentence in July 2016 after being convicted of accepting bribes, abusing his authority, and stealing state secrets.

  50. In a 2013 poll conducted by Pew Research, 53% of the respondents said that official corruption was a very big problem and an additional 31% said that it was a moderate problem. Thus, whereas in 2008, a total of 79% of those polled said that corruption was a problem, 84% had that view when polled in 2013. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, “Environmental Concerns on the Rise in China Many Also Worried about Inflation, Inequality, Corruption,” available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/19/environmental-concerns-on-the-rise-in-china/.

  51. Nee and Opper, for example, detail an informal endogenous property rights system that operates among private entrepreneurs in which trust is built largely through guanxi and in which “contracts” are “enforced” through “grim trigger” responses to failures to fulfill obligations that destroy the cheater’s reputation and essentially bar them from future collaborative ventures. In this system, ostracism and shunning, not bribes, are the primarily enforcement mechanism. [Victor Nee and Sonja Opper. [38]. Capitalism from Below: Markets and Institutional Change in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA

    Andrew Wedeman

  2. Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Washington, DC, USA

    Andrew Wedeman

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Wedeman, A. Bribery with Chinese Characteristics? Corruption, Fuzzy Property Rights, and Rapid Growth. East Asia 34, 87–111 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-017-9272-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-017-9272-3

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