Abstract
This paper argues that the Repugnant Conclusion which the Mere Addition Paradox generates is not the same as the one which a sum-aggregative view like impersonal total utilitarianism leads to, but a slightly more moderate version of it. Given a spectrum of outcomes {A, B, C, …, X, Y, Z} such that in each of them there is a population that is twice as large as the previous one and has a level of wellbeing that is just barely lower than the previous one, the Mere Addition Paradox implies that while almost all the outcomes of the spectrum are better than A, the last ones, such as Y and Z, will not, lest we accept that adding lives at a negative level is positive or neutral. This affects the way the Mere Addition Paradox should be presented.
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Horta, O., Rozas, M. A Problem in Standard Presentations of the Mere Addition Paradox. Acta Anal 37, 611–615 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00505-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00505-w