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The Inductive Route Towards Necessity

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It is generally assumed that relations of necessity cannot be known by induction on experience. In this paper, I propose a notion of situated possibilities, weaker than nomic possibilities, that is compatible with an inductivist epistemology for modalities. I show that assuming this notion, not only can relations of necessity be known by induction on our experience, but such relations cannot be any more underdetermined by experience than universal regularities. This means that any one believing in a universal regularity is as well warranted to believe in the corresponding relation of necessity.

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Correspondence to Quentin Ruyant.

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Ruyant, Q. The Inductive Route Towards Necessity. Acta Anal 35, 147–163 (2020).

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